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A. INTRODUCTION 
The market for corporate control plays an important role in disciplining the 
management of companies and can drive economic efficiency.
1
 Not only do mergers 
and acquisitions (“M&A”s)2 provide the opportunity for management innovation, the 
purchase of weak firms and the movement of capacity from declining to growth 
sectors, but they may allow the merging firms to engage in efficient consolidation, to 
increase productivity and to deliver technological innovation and efficiencies, for 
example, through achieving complementarities, economies of scale and scope. In 
recent years, cross-border M&As, through foreign direct investment (“FDI”),3 have 
increased dramatically in response to technological change, global competition and 
the liberalisation of markets.
4
 FDI has played a key role in the process of global 
economic integration and has been “positively correlated with growth”;5 for 
developed countries “the limited evidence available indicates fairly consistently that 
the productivity of domestically owned firms is positively related to the presence of 
foreign firms”,6 “that FDI triggers technology spillovers, assists human capital 
 
1
  See e.g., RS Ruback and MC Jensen, “The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence” 
(1983) 11 Journal of Financial Economics 5. 
2
  Although the term merger broadly refers to a situation where two or more formerly independent 
entities unite, every State adopts its own definition of what constitutes a merger for the purposes of 
their merger control rules (or other relevant legislation). For the EU definition see infra n 16 and 
text.  
3
  A company may make an investment in another country either by merging, setting up a joint 
venture with, or acquiring control over or a shareholding in, a business already registered in that 
country or by setting up its own business or subsidiary there (greenfield investment). The OECD 
defines FDI as an investment that “reflects the objective of establishing a lasting interest by a 
resident enterprise in one economy (direct investor) in an enterprise (direct investment enterprise) 
that is resident in an economy other than that of the direct investor. The lasting interest implies the 
existence of a long-term relationship between the direct investor and the direct investment 
enterprise and a significant degree of influence on the management of the enterprise. The direct or 
indirect ownership of 10% or more of the voting power of an enterprise resident in one economy 
by an investor resident in another economy is evidence of such a relationship”, see its Glossary at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investmentfordevelopment/2487495.pdf. In Case C-171/08, 
Commission v Portugal [2010] ECR I-6817, para 49, the Court of Justice (“Court”) distinguished 
between direct investment, in the form of participation in an undertaking through the holding of 
shares which confers the possibility of effectively participating in its management or control, and 
portfolio investment, involving investment in the form of acquisition of shares on the capital 
market for the purposes of making a financial investment without the intention of influencing 
management or control. This article focuses principally on measures within the EU which may 
preclude direct investment (or mergers) through, e.g., merger or foreign investment control rules. 
In 2007, an OECD report noted that cross-border M&As represented an estimated 80 per cent of 
total FDI flows among OECD countries, see OECD, Economic and Other Impacts of Foreign 
Corporate Takeovers in OECD Countries (2007). 
4
  See Almunia, SPEECH/13/360 “The evolutionary pressure of globalisation on competition 
control” ICN 12th annual conference, Warsaw, 24 April 2013 (FDI “passed from 6.5 % of world 
GDP in 1980 to over 30% before the onset of this long [financial and economic] crisis”). 
5
  IMF Working Paper, Middle Eastern Department, WP/Ol/175 “Determinants of, and the Relation 
between, Foreign Direct Investment and Growth: A Summary of the Recent Literature” Prepared 
by Ewe-Ghee Lim, November 2001. 
6
  Ibid. For a discussion of some of the benefits which have resulted in the UK from high amounts of 
inward and outward FDI, see speech of A Chisholm, “Public interest and competition-based 
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formation, contributes to international trade integration, helps create a more 
competitive business environment and enhances enterprise development”7 and that 
foreign owned firms outperform domestic ones in host countries. Cross-border M&As 
may thus promote economic growth by raising total factor productivity, gross 
domestic product and the efficiency of resources used in the host economy.
8
 
Despite the potential for mergers to produce benefits, there is concern that that many 
(or even most) mergers in fact fail to realise the efficiencies and innovation predicted 
and, consequently, the increase in value for shareholders.
9
 Indeed, one report 
commissioned by the European Commission (the “Commission”) concluded that even 
if mergers do sometimes create efficiencies there seemed to be “no empirical support 
for a general presumption” that they do so.10 In addition, mergers may be driven by a 
desire to increase (or have the consequence of increasing) market power
11
 and many 
major economies across the globe are sensitive about capital flows in and out of their 
States, the costs and benefits of inward FDI – especially when in the form of foreign 
takeovers
12
 – and its impact on national security, businesses perceived to be of 
national strategic importance, technological capabilities, jobs and exports.  
Although it may be difficult to second-guess and to identify in advance those mergers 
that will, or will not, work out for the company, the economy and shareholders,
13
 most 
jurisdictions do not leave the market unbridled to govern the outcome of a merger 
proposal but scrutinise proposed mergers with, or foreign investment in, domestic 
companies carefully, not only to assess the impact of such conduct on competition and 
efficiency, but also to assess its effect on national security or the wider public interest. 
Policies towards foreign takeovers have become increasingly stringent since the 1990s 
and, in recent years, there have been numerous instances, both within and outside of 
the EU, in which the impact of a proposed merger on the national interest, and the 
 
merger control: An agency perspective on the lessons from evolution of the current regime” 12 
September 2014, Fordham Competition Law Institute Annual Conference, 8-9. 
7
  Given the appropriate host-country policies and a basic level of development, OECD, Foreign 
Direct Investment for Development: Maximising Benefits and Minimising Costs (2002) 
(concluding that the macroeconomic benefits of inward FDI in most cases outweigh the costs. See 
also OECD n 3. 
8
  OECD, n 3, 68-70 (cross-border openness may also contribute to national security and regional or 
international stabilisation). See also A Nourry and N Jung, “Protectionism in the Age of Austerity - 
A Further Unlevelling of the Playing Field” (2012) 8(1) Competition Policy International 1. 
9
  See e.g., speech/02/252, M Monti, “Review of the EC Merger Regulation – Roadmap for the 
Reform Project”, speech to British Chamber of Commerce, Brussels, 4 June 2002 and Chisholm, n 
6. 
10
  See L-H Röller, J Stennek, F Verboven, "Efficiency Gains From Mergers", European Economy, 
no5/2001, Brussels and speech by Monti, ibid.  
11
  FM Scherer and D Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance (3rd edn., 
Houghton Mifflin, 1990), 160. 
12
  Although economic theory is neutral as to the form FDI takes, Governments tend to be more 
welcoming of FDI through greenfield investment (see n 3) and more suspicious of FDI through 
foreign M&As, OECD, n 3, 70-71. 
13
  See e.g., Chisholm, n 6. But see the discussion of the “net benefit” test used in foreign investment 
review in Canada (and which has been suggested in a legislative proposal in the US), infra nn  65 
and 66. 
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pros and cons of inward FDI more generally, has provoked debate which is reported 
on extensively in the media. Indeed, this trend of greater suspicion towards foreign 
investment looks set to continue as popular backlash against foreign control of key 
national businesses, and calls for Governments to protect national industry, appear to 
be mounting. Within the EU for example, in 2014, Pfizer’s proposed acquisition of 
UK pharmaceuticals company, AstraZeneca, and General Electric’s (“GE”) proposed 
acquisition of French energy and transport company, Alstom, triggered significant 
national anxiety in the UK and France respectively. In both jurisdictions 
commentators expressed concern about the impact of the proposed transactions on the 
national interest and both cases raised the potential for differences in opinion as to 
how the benefits and costs of the respective transactions should be assessed and 
weighed and a clash between proponents of the principle of an open market economy 
and proponents of greater protectionism.  
An important additional feature of cases arising in the EU, however, is that they raise 
delicate issues relating to the balance of competence between the EU and the Member 
States. Within the EU, there are significant differences manifest between the attitudes 
and policies displayed towards FDI and cross-border mergers by the EU, on the one 
hand, and a number of the Member States, on the other and between the Member 
States more generally. The EU, in particular, has, in recent years, generally sought to 
establish a reputation as an open environment for foreign investment and trade. Not 
only are the four fundamental freedoms specifically designed to achieve an EU 
internal market within which goods, persons, services and capital can move freely 
between the Member States, but the free movement of capital provisions also extend 
to movements between the Member States and third countries.
14
 In addition, the EU 
works for the abolition of restrictions on international trade and open markets in 
bilateral and global relations, advocating the view that such measures drive growth 
and create jobs to the benefit of all EU citizens. Although the Commission does have 
an extensive general power under the EU Merger Regulation, Regulation 139/2004 
(“EUMR”),15 to review foreign investment through large scale “concentrations” 
(essentially, mergers between two or more undertakings, changes in control over an 
undertaking and the creation of autonomous full-function joint ventures
16
) with an EU 
dimension,
17
 these provisions do not draw a formal policy distinction between EU and 
non-EU investment but only permit the Commission to prohibit transactions which 
may lead to a significant impediment to effective competition in the EU. The EUMR 
is thus based on “competition” interests and is designed to prevent mergers which will 
limit competition between the merging parties and result in higher prices, lower 
quality, services and products, and/or reduced output or innovation to the detriment of 
consumers. 
 
14
  The framework in relation to third countries has some differences, see infra n 26 and C.2.d.ii. 
15
  [2004] OJ L 24/1. 
16
  EUMR, Art 3. 
17
  EUMR, Art 2 and see infra C.3. 
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Most of the Member States, in contrast, have broader powers to assess the impact of a 
merger, or foreign M&As, on both competition and the “public interest”.18 Indeed, it 
will be seen in this paper that they do, not infrequently, rely on such powers (or 
consider relying upon them), both to shield nationally important firms from 
significant foreign investment and/or to support the creation of “national champions”, 
and concerns have been voiced about “serious signals of an increase in protectionist 
threats in Europe”.19  
Given the different approaches manifest, the important question addressed in this 
article is who has competence, and when, to interfere with the market for corporate 
control and to weigh the economic and other costs and benefits of M&A activity 
within the EU; is it competition or other regulatory or administrative authorities 
and/or politicians, and at what level, that of the EU and/or the Member States? It is 
well-established in the EU, that competition authorities should have the power to 
assess the impact on mergers using an economics-based competition assessment. 
Since 1990, not only have EU merger rules conferred explicit power on the 
Commission to review certain concentrations and to assess their impact on 
competition within the EU, but the EUMR sets out well-trodden rules which allocate 
jurisdiction to appraise such concentrations between, respectively, the Commission 
and the national competition authorities of the Member States (“NCAs”, which 
appraise concentrations without an EU dimension under national law).
20
  
This paper consequently focuses on the more controversial issue which has received 
relatively little attention in the literature; the extent to which public policy factors are 
permitted to impact on merger control within the EU and to override competition law 
assessments. In particular, it analyses (i) how EU law, especially the free movement 
rules and the EUMR limit the ability of the Member States either to impose obstacles 
in the path of foreign mergers (whether from inside or outside of the EU/EEA) or to 
authorise the creation of national champions, on public interest grounds and (ii) how 
EU law seeks to balance EU goals against the acutely felt and sensitive national 
interests at stake.  
In order to resolve these issues, section B commences by introducing more fully when 
EU or Member States may take account of public interest factors under merger, 
foreign investment or other rules. Section C then goes on to examine the relationship 
between EU and national law in this sphere, the constraints that EU law imposes on 
the enactment, or exercise, of national rules and the implications for the types of 
national law referred to in section B. It notes that although EU law recognises the 
right of Member States to put obstacles in the path of foreign mergers where 
necessary to protect public interest, policy and/or security matters in their States, it 
nonetheless plays an interventionist role, imposing important checks on their ability to 
do so, which are often not fully reflected on, or covered, in national debates 
 
18
  It will be seen in the discussion below that the Member States and EU law adopt differing notions 
and/or definitions of the public interest. The term is used broadly here to refer to any “non-
competition” factors which might impact on the assessment of a merger.  
19
  Including by (then) Vice-President Almunia of the Commission, see GCR, “The Europeans 
Champions League” 25 July 2014 (noting “a marked increase in protectionist grumblings in parts 
of Europe”). 
20
  See infra C.3, especially n 166. 
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surrounding controversial proposed M&A transactions. Indeed, it indicates that those 
limits are greater than is perhaps generally recognised. In addition, Member States 
must not exercise national law in a manner which violates these rules or the EUMR. 
Given concerns about a rising tide of protectionism within the EU, an important issue 
which is also considered is whether EU law has effective enforcement mechanisms in 
place which can be used to prevent a Member State enacting, or relying on, legislation 
which is in breach of EU law (see section D). 
Sections D and E conclude that although EU law clearly prohibits national laws that 
impose unjustified obstacles in the path of investment from other EU Member States, 
it may not always be able to prevent the authorisation of national champions which 
may damage competition within the EU and that changes to the EUMR would be 
required to deal with this latter problem. Further, the extent to which Member States 
are able to control investments from third countries (outside of the EU/EEA, 
especially where EU firms have no reciprocal access to the home jurisdiction of the 
acquiring firm) is extremely sensitive and controversial and requires clarification. It is 
also noted that although some problems do lie in preventing Member States from 
taking protectionist steps and violating fundamental provisions of EU law, 
enforcement mechanisms are in place which can help to ensure the effectiveness of 
EU law.  
B. MERGER AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT CONTROL WITHIN THE 
EU  
1.  THE EU APPROACH 
The EU has exclusive competence over competition law in so far as it is necessary for 
the establishment of an internal market and has had exclusive competence over FDI 
since Lisbon.
21
 The EU has not yet, however, concluded any bilateral investment 
Treaty (“BIT”) or free trade agreement with an investment chapter22 or generally 
enacted rules which specifically control foreign investment.
23
 The EU’s current 
 
21
  Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”), Art 3(1)(b) (conferring exclusive EU 
competence over competition) and Art 3(1)(e) (conferring exclusive EU competence over the 
common commercial policy (“CCP”) – TFEU, Art 207 provides that the CCP is based on uniform 
principles with regard to a number of factors, including FDI). Exclusive competence means that 
only the EU may legislate and adopt legally binding acts unless it empowers Member States to do 
so (see Treaty on European Union (“TEU”), Art 2(1)).The original Treaty establishing the 
European Economic Community (“EEC”) has been amended, and renumbered, on a number of 
occasions, including by the Single European Act and the Treaties of Maastricht (the Treaty on 
European Union (“TEU”)), Amsterdam, Nice and, most recently, Lisbon. Prior to the Treaty of 
Lisbon, the CCP only encompassed aspects of foreign investment.  
22
  It is, however, in the process of negotiating some, including with the US (the Transatlantic Trade 
Investment Partnership (“TTIP”) and Canada (a draft of the EU-Canada Comprehensive Trade and 
Economic Agreement (“CETA”) is available on the Commission’s website), see 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/agreements/. Prior to Lisbon, the individual 
Member States had, between them, negotiated in excess of 1000 BITs. Many of these will remain 
in force until they are replaced by new EU Treaties, see Regulation 1219/2012 [2012] OJ L 
315/40. The EU is, however, a member of the Energy Charter Treaty (a regional agreement 
relating to energy investment). 
23
  But see, however, an exception which operates in the airlines industry, Regulation 1008/2008 
[2008] OJ L 293/3, Art 4(f) (stating that an undertaking is to be granted an operating licence 
provided that certain conditions are satisfied including that Member States and/or nationals of 
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approach to foreign investment, not only between Member States but from third 
countries, is ordinarily to welcome and encourage it and to support the principle of an 
open market economy.
24
 
First, in addition to the internal market provisions relating to the free movement of 
goods (Article 34 TFEU), services (Article 56 TFEU) and freedom of establishment 
(Article 49 TFEU), Article 63 TFEU prohibits, subject to limited exceptions
25
 “all 
restrictions on the movement of capital” between Member States and between 
Member States and third countries. Uniquely amongst, the four freedoms, the capital 
rules have applied, since the Maastricht Treaty, to support the rules on the single 
currency, not only to restrictions on flows of capital between EU Member States but 
also to restrictions on flows between EU and third countries, albeit subject to a less 
liberalised framework. Arguably these capital rules reach “beyond any comparable 
foreign investment law or constitutional provision in any other jurisdiction in the 
world”26 and they are discussed in greater detail in section C below. 
Secondly, the EU is committed to the progressive abolition of restrictions on FDI
27
 
and works, through its participation in organisations such as WTO, OECD, G20 and 
G8, to promote a level playing field, based on open and sustainable investment. The 
EU has so far been resistant to calls for the introduction of broader laws to prevent 
foreign owners from spiriting away “technology” and moving “the workforce outside 
of Europe”.28 For example, Commissioner Almunia has stated:  
“Europe should continue to welcome foreign investments – just as we wish European 
investments to be welcomed in other parts of the world – because these deals bring 
benefits to everyone. Our economies need access to competitive services and 
investments, and our companies can only become real European or global champions 
 
Member States own more than 50 % of the undertaking and effectively control it, whether directly 
or indirectly through one or more intermediate undertakings, except as provided for in an 
agreement with a third country to which the EU is a party). 
24
  See TFEU, Art 119 and 206, but see e.g., Nourry and Jung, n 8, 8-9. 
25
  See infra C.2.b. 
26
  See http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/capital/third-countries/treaty_provisions/index_en.htm. 
The original EEC Treaty provision on free movement of capital (EEC, Art 67) had limited reach 
but the provision was radically overhauled (to its current wording, now in TFEU, Art 63) by the 
Maastricht Treaty to support the rules on the single currency and to ensure liberalisation for the 
benefit of EU citizens, companies and governments; free movement of capital will lead to optimal 
allocation of resources and the integration of open, competitive and efficient EU markets, help to 
maintain responsible macro-economic policy and foster growth through financial and knowledge 
transfers. Three reasons for the extended territorial scope for the capital provisions are that free 
movement of capital between Member States would undermine capital control towards third 
countries as investors would enter/exist the EU via the most liberal jurisdiction to access the target 
state; it bolsters the credibility of the single currency; and contributes to the principle of an open 
market economy, see C Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms (Oxford 
University Press, 4
th
 edn, 2013), 584-5, relying on J Snell, “Free movement of capital: Evolution as 
a non-linear process” in P Craig and G de Bŭrca (eds) The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford 
University Press,  2011).  
27
  See supra n 24. 
28
  The EU has power under TFEU, Arts 64(2)(3) and 66 to take measures on the free movement of 
capital in certain circumstances but it has not yet exercised these powers.  
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if they are encouraged to become more innovative and efficient; not if they are 
shielded from competition. Closing home markets as a reaction to protectionism 
abroad can only be a damaging move for everyone. Therefore, we must work for 
reciprocity in opening markets – not in closing them.”29 
Indeed, it is possible that new investment Treaties currently being negotiated by the 
EU with third countries, such as the US and Canada, will include both post-
establishment commitments, not to discriminate against foreign investors compared 
with domestic, or other third-country, investors, to ensure fair and equitable treatment 
of foreign investors and not to impair foreign investment through arbitrary or 
unreasonable measures, and pre-establishment obligations, setting out an obligation 
not to subject foreign investors wishing to enter the EU to less favourable treatment 
than nationals, or investors from other third countries, unless an exception applies (for 
example, for national security or for certain excluded sectors set out in a negative 
list).
30
 
Thirdly, although the Commission has jurisdiction to scrutinise foreign investment 
through “concentrations” with an EU dimension under the EUMR, these rules only 
ensure that corporate reorganisations do not result in lasting damage to the 
competitive environment in the internal market and provide no explicit basis for 
distinguishing between concentrations depending on where the investment emanates 
from. On the contrary, the Commission staunchly maintains that it conducts merger 
analysis in a way that is free of considerations that are not relevant to competition 
enforcement. Thus despite wrangling at the time EU Merger control rules were first 
introduced over the question of whether the substantive test for assessment of mergers 
should be based solely on “competition” grounds, and the obligation of the 
Commission to conduct its appraisal within the general framework of the fundamental 
objectives of the Treaties,
31
 the Commission has, to date, not accepted that the 
substantive test for the assessment of EU mergers, opens the door to industrial policy 
or other non-competition considerations, such as social policy. In particular: 
(a) The Directorate-General for Competition at the Commission (“DG Comp”) has 
not, when scrutinising mergers, been willing to endorse attempts by Member 
States to protect or create national champions which are not to the consumers’ 
advantage or which form an obstacle to competition. Rather, it adheres to the view 
that EU rules allow firms to search for the best scale and size to compete globally, 
but ensures that they face sufficient competition to secure performance in 
 
29
  SPEECH/11/561, Policy Objectives in Merger Control, Fordham Competition Conference, New 
York, 8 September 2011. See also report prepared by M Monti for the President of the European 
Commission, “A New Strategy for the Single Market: At the Service of Europe’s Economy and 
Society”, 9 May 2010. 
30
  See supra n 22 and e.g., CETA, Art X.7. Most BITs negotiated by EU Member States do not 
incorporate pre-establishment commitments. 
31
  See e.g., A Jones and B Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (OUP, 5 edn, 
2014), ch 15. 
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international markets. It has thus at times, controversially precluded mergers 
which would have created a national champion;
32
 
(b) Although some commentators have expressed concern that the Commission’s 
willingness to adopt an expansive approach to the concept of an undertaking and 
single economic unit in the context of state-owned enterprises (“SOE”s) heightens 
the risk of EU merger review and distorts merger assessment involving, for 
example Chinese companies,
33
 the Commission has stressed that it applies the 
same criteria to all transactions, wherever the inward investment originates from:
34
  
“And I can assure you that EU merger control will remain on that track. I can give 
you concrete examples of this. Earlier this year we cleared without conditions a 
string of mergers involving companies owned by the Chinese state: China 
National Bluestar/Elkem, DSM/Sinochem, Petrochina/Ineos, and 
Huaneng/Intergen. In all these cases, we applied the same criteria that we adopt to 
assess mergers involving companies controlled by EU countries. This goes to 
show that our analysis is based on competition considerations only, and is 
irrespective of the nationality of the companies. And I expect that European 
companies will enjoy the same treatment when competition authorities in other 
parts of the world review their merger projects”; 
(c) The EUMR affords no grounds for applying less favourable rules, and for 
retaliating against, companies of third countries that discriminate against EU 
companies in their own merger control or foreign investment legislation;
35
 
(d) It is true that final merger decisions are taken by the College of Commissioners,36 
and that in some controversial or politically charged cases vigorous lobbying of 
the Competition Commissioner
37
 or the other Commissioners takes place. 
Nonetheless, it does not appear that such lobbying has, in recent years at least,
38
 
affected the final outcome of merger decisions. Thus although some high-profile 
 
32
  See, e.g., IP/04/501, “The Commission puts industry centre stage and reinforces competitiveness in 
an enlarged European Union”, Case M.469, MSG Media Service GmbH (1994) and Case M.1672, 
Volvo/Scania (2001). 
33
  See e.g., A Zhang, “The Single Entity Theory: An Antitrust Time-bomb for Chinese State-Owned 
Enterprises” (2012) 8(4) Journal of Competition Law and Economics 805. 
34
  SPEECH/11/561, n 29. 
35
  Rather, it provides for the possibility of negotiation with third countries for obtaining comparable 
treatment for undertakings have their seat or principal field of activity in the EU, EUMR, Art 24. 
36
  A political body of appointees that is not directly involved in the process leading up to the 
adoption of the decision. 
37
  For example, prior to the Commission’s decision in Case M.7018 Telefonica Deutschland/E-Plus 
(2014), Angela Merkel and Jean-Claude Juncker (now President of the Commission) expressed 
their view that the Commission should make it easier for telecom operators to merge so that they 
can compete more effectively in international markets.  
38
  But see e.g., Case M.315, Mannesmann/Vallourec/Ilva (1994) (where DG Comp had proposed 
prohibiting the merger on the ground that it would lead to the creation of a collective dominant 
position on the Western European market for seamless steel tubes, but the concentration was 
strongly supported by the Commissioner responsible for industry and ultimately cleared narrowly 
by the Commission, W Sauter, Competition Law and Industrial Policy in the EU (Clarendon Press, 
1997), 140).  
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merger cases, such as the merger between NYSE Euronext and Deutsche Börse or 
other proposed concentrations which might have created a European champion,
39
 
may have caused public clashes between advocates of industrial policy and 
supporters of a competition policy based strictly on competition factors alone, in 
most cases the Commission has resolutely opposed mergers which will 
significantly impede effective competition in the EU.
40
 In practice, therefore, the 
College of Commissioners ordinarily accept the decisions prepared by DG Comp 
overseen by the Commissioner for competition. It is noteworthy, however, that in 
2012 then Commission President Barroso asked Commissioner Almunia to give 
early advance notice of cases with a dimension going beyond the scope of 
competition policy which might impact on other EU policies.
41
 In addition, it 
remains to be seen whether the position will change under the new Commission 
and how its new structure, emphasising cooperation and coordination between the 
Commissioners, might translate in policy terms.
42
  
Even though it is possible that things might change in the future, Competition 
Commissioners have, to date, worked hard to send the message that industrial and 
other “non-competition” criteria do not prevail in EU merger policy.43 In addition, it is 
seen in section C that the Commission seeks to tackle “nationalistic” or 
“protectionist” measures by Member States by bringing proceedings against them 
where national rules, or actions based upon them, breach EU law.  
2. THE APPROACH OF THE MEMBER STATES 
Most of the EU Member States, in contrast, have in place laws, whether set out in 
merger, regulatory, foreign investment, or other, rules, which permit Governments, or 
NCAs, to take account of a broader range of “non-competition” - public interest or 
public policy - factors in determining whether a merger, acquisition or investment 
should be authorised, prohibited or otherwise controlled. The range of applicable rules 
and relevant public interest factors vary significantly from Member State to Member 
State but, collectively, potentially allow for a vast spectrum of issues to impact on the 
assessment of whether a proposed investment or merger transaction should be able to 
proceed.
44
 In particular: 
 
39
  See e.g., Case M.6166, NYSE Euronext/Deutsche Börse (2012). 
40
  See e.g., Case M.53, Aérospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland (1991), Case M.469, MSG/ Media Services 
GmbH (1994), Case M.1672, Volvo/Scania (2001), Case M.6166, ibid and SPEECH/09/152,  N 
Kroes, “Competition, the crisis and the road to recovery”, Address at Economic Club of Toronto, 
Toronto, 30 March 2009.   
41
  See minutes of the 2022
nd
 meeting of the Commission, PV(2012)2022 final. A few cases, see e.g., 
n 38 and Case M.6471, Outokumpu/Inoxumm (2014) are discussed, therefore, where the decision 
needs to be considered in a wider context. As the Commission’s decisions are subject to review by 
the EU courts, they would of course risk annulment if, for political purposes, the law were to be 
misinterpreted or misapplied. 
42
  In particular, the Competition Commissioner has to contribute to projects steered or coordinated 
by, and to liaise closely with, the Vice President for Jobs, Growth, Investment and 
Competitiveness, see e.g., Mission Letter from Jean-Claude Juncker to Margrethe Vestager, 
http://ec.europa.eu/about/juncker-commission/docs/vestager_en.pdf. 
43
  See, e.g., Monti, n 9, and  Sauter, n 38, 140. 
44
  See e.g., Getting the Deal Through Mergers 2014, and answers to questions 8 and 22. 
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(1) A number of Member States permit the Government to intervene in, and to 
review, relevant mergers which raise public interest considerations and where 
necessary to override any competition law assessment conducted.
45
 These powers 
may permit the Government either to prohibit (or subject to conditions) relevant 
mergers, and/or to authorise them on public interest grounds. For example, in 
France, the French Minster for the Economy has broad power to intervene at the 
end of second phase merger analysis conducted by the competition authority and 
to take decisions based on public interest factors (other than the maintenance of 
competition such as industrial development, maintaining employment or the 
competitiveness of the undertakings in international markets),
46
 and in the UK, the 
Enterprise Act 2002 (“EA”)47 permits the UK Secretary of State both to prohibit, 
subject to conditions or to authorise relevant mergers on defined public interest 
grounds – currently national security, media public interest considerations and the 
stability of the UK financial system  (although new public interest considerations 
may be added by the Secretary of State by order
48
). In Lloyds TSB/HBOS, for 
example, the UK Government took the view that the public interest in the stability 
of the UK financial system outweighed the concerns of the NCA that the merger 
was likely to lead to a substantially lessening of competition in relation to banking 
services and the provision of mortgages in the UK. It thus encouraged and 
authorised the merger.  
Further: in Germany, the Federal Minister of Economics and Technology can, 
under the terms of the Competition Act, intervene in the application of national 
merger rules and authorise a merger (and overrule a decision of the German NCA, 
the Bundeskartellamt, to prohibit it), if the negative effect of the merger on 
competition is outweighed by the benefits to the economy as a whole or if the 
merger is justified by an overriding public interest;
49
 in the Netherlands, the 
minister of economic affairs may, upon the refusal by the competition authority to 
issue a license clearing a merger, issue a licence authorising an envisaged 
concentration on general interest (whether economic or non-economic) grounds;
50
 
and Ministers in a number of other jurisdictions have power to veto, subject to 
 
45
  In Belgium, the Government’s power to overturn merger decisions of the competition authority on 
public interest grounds was withdrawn in September 2013, 2013 Belgian Competition Act. 
46
  Although to date this power has never been used. 
47
  Prior to the EA, the UK merger regime set out in the Fair Trading Act 1973 required the authorities 
to apply a public interest test and to take account of all matters which appeared to be relevant. For 
the view that such a broad public interest test led to a lack of transparency and predictability and 
room for the exercise of political preferences and that the EA regime, establishing a fully 
independent and competition-based regime has been positive for businesses and has promoted 
public confidence in the regime, see Chisholm, n 5. 
48
  EA, s 58. There also rules in place in relation to mergers which raise special public interest 
considerations (including those involving certain government contractors that possess information 
relating to defence and of a confidential nature). 
49
  See e.g, the discussion of the merger between E.ON and RuhrGas infra n 219. 
50
  Dutch Competition Act, s 47 (although the minister cannot prohibit a merger approved by the 
competition authority). 
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conditions, or authorise M&A transactions relating to assets in key industries, 
such as defence, national security, energy, communications and transportation.
51
  
In some jurisdictions “non-competition” considerations, in particular industrial 
policy, may also play a role in the merger control conducted by the NCA. In 
Austria and Italy, for example, NCAs can exceptionally authorise concentrations 
having adverse effects on competition if necessary to preserve or enhance the 
international competitiveness of the undertakings involved
52
 or for reasons 
connected with the general interests of the national economy.
53
 In some cases 
NCAs may also have to take into consideration opinions of, or cooperate with, 
sector-specific regulatory bodies, for example, in the telecoms, financial, 
insurance or health sectors; 
(2) Some Member States also have specific rules governing foreign investment. For 
example:  
 in Germany, in 2009 rules were enacted which restrict the direct or indirect 
acquisition of at least 25% of the voting rights of a German company on 
public interest grounds, in particular where an acquisition by a non EU / EFTA 
(European Free-Trade Area) investor endangers the public order or security of 
the Federal Republic of Germany or where the acquisition by a foreign 
(including EU/EFTA) investor is of a German company whose activity is 
defence-related and so endangers the security interests of the Federal Republic 
of Germany;
54
  
 in France, foreign investments in companies registered in France which 
operate in a broad spectrum of specified sectors are subject to an ex ante 
governmental authorisation system.
55
 These foreign investment rules were 
amended, following the approach by GE to Alstom, in May 2014,
56
 by 
expanding the scope of strategic sectors covered (to include energy, water, 
transport, electronic communications, protection of public health) and 
requiring authorisation for these sectors where the activities exercised by the 
 
51
  This is the case e.g: in Italy, where the Strategic Assets in these sectors have been specifically 
identified (see e.g., D.P.C.M. November 30, 2012 No. 253, as amended by D.P.C.M. October 2, 
2013 n 129 and Presidential Decree March 25, 2014, No. 85 (there must however be an 
“exceptional effective threat of serious prejudice” of the relevant defence, national security or 
other national interest at stake, Law Decree March 15, 2012 No. 21 (amended by Law May 11, 
2012 No. 56)); and in Spain, see Ninth Additional Provision of Law 3/2013, 4 June, on the creation 
of the National Markets and Competition Commission. 
52
  See Austrian Cartel Act, s 12(2). This provision has not had practical relevance for some time, 
however. 
53
  Italian Antitrust Law, s 25(1) (as the criteria as to how this provision should be applied have not 
been laid down, the exception has not been applied). But see e.g., Case Nos. 19248 and 23496 
Alitalia/AirOne, 3 December 2008 and 11 April 2012.  
54
  The German Foreign Trade Ordinance.  
55
  See the French Monetary and Financial Code and Decree No. 2005-1739. All investments must be 
formally notified to, and approved by, the Treasury and a standstill obligation applies. A stricter 
regime applies for non-EU/EEA investments. 
56
  Decree No.2014-479 (the French Decree on Foreign Direct Investments of 14 May 2014), see also 
discussion of the proposed merger between GE and Alstom infra n 78 and text. 
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French company in which the investment is contemplated  are essential to 
guarantee the country’s interests in relation to public order, public security or 
national defence;
57
 
 in Austria, certain investments in companies with their registered seat in 
Austria by foreign buyers (that are located outside the EU/EEA or 
Switzerland) relating to public security and public order have to be notified to 
the Federal Ministry of Economy, Family and Youth for approval under the 
Foreign Trade Act;
58
   
 in Italy the government may prohibit an acquisition of an Italian company by a 
foreign company for reasons of national economy if, in the country of origin 
of the buyer, Italian companies are subjected to discrimination, in particular in 
relation to their ability to acquire local companies.
59
 
Thousands of bilateral investment treaties (“BIT”s) also exist between EU 
Member States and third countries.
60
 
(3) In a number of Member States, various regulatory approvals and/or consultations 
are required under sector-specific legislation for the acquisition of certain 
regulated businesses and businesses operating in specific sectors, for example the 
financial or insurance sector,
61 
health sector,
62
 cinema exhibition services, 
telecommunication, energy, broadcasting or media companies.
63
  
The EU Member States are not alone in their concern about the wider public policy 
issues raised by mergers. A number of other major economies across the globe also 
have specific powers to review foreign investment or to take account of industrial 
policy and other non-competition factors in the application of the merger control 
regime or other regulatory rules. For example, in the US the President has power to 
block foreign acquisitions where “there is credible evidence … that the foreign 
 
57
  The list of sectors covered, which are broader when the investment contemplated is by a non-
EU/EEA investor, now include defence, security, weapons and ammunition, cryptology, security 
of information systems, gambling, private security, research against bio-terrorism, materials used 
for intercepting correspondences and conversations, dual use technologies, energy (gas, electricity, 
hydrocarbons), water, transport, electronic communications, vital construction works and public 
health. 
58
  See Austrian Foreign Trade Act, s 25a. 
59
  Ibid, s 25(2). This provision has not, however, been used to date. 
60
  See supra n 22. 
61
  This is the case in e.g., the UK, Belgium (although these regulatory notification requirements do 
not offer the Belgian authorities a possibility to intervene in a merger or acquisition on “non-
competition” grounds) and the Netherlands (see e.g., Protocol between the Dutch Central Bank 
N.V. and the Dutch Competition Authority concerning concentrations within the financial sector 
during emergency situations, published in the Government Gazette on 3 January 2011). In the UK, 
the Industry Act 1975 also confers power on the Secretary of State to prohibit changes of control 
over an important manufacturing undertaking where that the change of control would be contrary 
to the interests of the United Kingdom, or any substantial part of it. This power has never been 
exercised, however. 
62
  See e.g., Health Care (Market Regulation) Act, Art 49a. 
63
  Italian Antitrust Law, s 20. 
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interest exercising control might take action that threatens to impair the national 
security”.64 Anxieties about Japanese, UK, Chinese and other foreign investment 
have, especially post-9/11, frequently led to political firestorms and calls by Members 
of Congress and other relevant stakeholders for the Committee on Foreign Investment 
in the United States and the President to protect national defence, critical 
infrastructure and technology by exercising this power. Further, in 2014 legislation 
was proposed to expand the types of investment subject to national security review 
and to subject certain foreign investment to a “net benefit” test.65 In Canada, the 
Investment Canada Act 1985 confers broad powers on the Government to review 
whether certain direct acquisitions of control by a non-Canadian of a significant 
Canadian business is likely to be of net benefit to Canada
66
 and in China, there is an 
overlap between the national security review, the mergers and acquisitions review 
conducted under the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law (“AML”) and the foreign business 
licensing process. Indeed, as MOFCOM plays a role in the national security and 
foreign business licensing processes and must consider industrial policy and national 
security along with competition issues under the AML, “there is often suspicion 
among the international business community that MOFCOM applies the AML to 
protect domestic industries from foreign competition”.67  
In addition to actually having these types of powers, it is clear that Governments 
frequently face intense pressure from politicians, business, private interest groups and 
the public, to exercise, or extend, them and so to protect the national or public interest. 
The issues are frequently hotly debated in the media which may serve to escalate 
public fear (especially of FDI from certain jurisdictions) and to reinforce and 
strengthen the importance of views expressed so, arguably, making it harder for a 
Government to ignore and resist them.
68
 Indeed, it seems likely that in some cases 
Governments may feel pressure to respond to expressed public concern for short-term 
political purposes (in particular to protect their own popularity and their own interest 
in re-election). Where they do so respond, intuitive and emotional responses may be 
 
64
  See eg Exon-Florio amendments of Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. 
65
  See on the current US regime e.g., I  Knable Gotts, “Transaction Parties Need to Consider Foreign 
Investment Laws as Part of Pre-Deal Planning” (2014) Annual Proceedings of the Fordham 
Competition Law Institute forthcoming and A Zhang, “Foreign Direct Investment from China: 
Sense and Sensibility” (2014) 34(3) Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 395. 
Although the President’s decisions on the merits are not judicially reviewable, the DC Circuit held 
in Docket No 13-5315, Ralls Corporation v Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, 
15 July 2014, that where the President intends to suspend or prohibit a transaction, the affected 
parties must be afforded certain due process rights, in particular, notice of the intended action, 
access to the underlying unclassified evidence and a meaningful opportunity to rebut that evidence. 
66
  Although between 2009-2014 all but one deal reviewed under this procedure were approved, the 
Act was relied upon to block BHP Billiton’s bid for Canada’s Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan 
Inc in 2010, see e.g., CS Goldman, MS Koch, “The Interface between Competition Law and 
Foreign Investment Merger Reviews: Flying Blind or with Radar?” (2014) (2014) Annual 
Proceedings of the Fordham Competition Law Institute forthcoming. 
67
  Zhang, n 65. See also e.g., South Africa, where the legislation specifically permits social and 
political factors, such as employment and black economic empowerment, to be taken into account 
in merger review. 
68
  There may be asymmetries which mean that it is much harder for the beneficiaries of the 
acquisition and the foreign acquirer to make their views heard, Chisholm, n 6, 12. 
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permitted to trump careful longer-term cost and benefit analysis of the transaction.
69
 
Further, because decision-taking under public interest regimes becomes less 
transparent and predictable, businesses and bidders may not have confidence in the 
regime and transactions may be deterred.
70
 
In May 2014, for example, the UK Government came under intense pressure to 
intervene to influence the outcome of a proposed takeover of UK pharmaceutical firm, 
AstraZeneca, by US company, Pfizer. The British media reported extensively on the 
question of whether the merger would pose a significant threat to the UK economy 
and national interest and whether a commitment by Pfizer to retain 20% of the 
combined group’s research and development (”R&D”) workforce in the UK and to 
maintain R&D in the UK would be of sufficient value to allay any such national 
concerns.
71
 Although at first the Government appeared neutral toward the deal,
72
 
public concern and political debate about the merger mounted,
73
 leading the 
Government to cautiously explore the question of whether a public interest 
intervention might be feasible.
74
 In the end no decision had to be taken immediately as 
 
69
  For the view that heuristics and cognitive biases influence public perception and may lead to 
irrational policy responses, see Zhang, n 65. See also SPEECH/11/561, n 29, of J Almunia who, 
when discussing the relations between merger control, global investments and cross-border 
integration, stressed that although advocates of foreign investment control, who express fear that a 
foreign owner will move technology and employment outside of Europe (but at times conceal a 
request for protectionist measures), might encourage populist politicians, he considered these 
arguments to be weak bases for policy-making; “A responsible policy-maker needs to see good 
evidence, not anecdotes”.  
70
  This was arguably a problem with the UK regime prior to the EA coming into force, see supra n 47 
and could provide strong arguments for not introducing national measures which permit politicians 
to intervene on public interest grounds, see Chisholm, n 6, 11. 
71
  See e.g., http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2625719/Pressure-grows-David-Cameron-
intervene-Pfizer-bid-survey-reveals-public-wants-ministers-step-in.html. There was concern that 
commitments would prove meaningless, as had been the commitments given by Kraft prior to its 
acquisition of Cadbury. In this case days after its takeover of Cadbury, Kraft is alleged to have 
reneged on its promise, given prior to the takeover, that it would keep Cadbury’s UK plant open 
(instead it moved production to Poland). For the view that availability heuristics (whereby people 
judge the frequency of events by reference to the ease by which instances can be brought to mind) 
suggests that frequently publicised events are perceived to be probable, see Zhang, n 65. 
72
  Believing that it would, if accepted by shareholders, allow beneficial inward investment into 
Britain and act as a signal as to the strength of the British economy and its attractiveness as a place 
to do business. 
73
  In particular, anxiety was expressed that it was likely to have a distracting and disruptive impact on 
AstraZeneca’s business and would have a devastating impact on British jobs, research capabilities 
and R&D in the life science sectors. Lord Heseltine, adviser on economic growth to David 
Cameron, used the case as a basis for arguing that Britain needed, in step with other major 
economies, to build up its legal defences against foreign takeovers, especially ones which might 
impact on long-term industrial capabilities in the UK. The opposition party also advocated the 
need for broader public interest powers to be incorporated into the EA and suggested that it would 
move to block the deal if it had not yet closed, and it was in power, following the 2015 general 
election. It was the Labour Government, however, which, precisely to make the regime 
independent of government, in 2002 removed Ministers from decision making about mergers, apart 
from in a few specified public interest areas.  
74
  By expanding the public interest grounds set out in the EA by Order, see supra n 48 (although the 
impact of the deal on incentives to innovate would be relevant to a competition law assessment 
under merger rules, see Chisholm, n 6, 12). 
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a number of factors
75
 eventually combined to contribute to the bid failing.
76
 
Nonetheless, the UK Government subsequently considered whether it should expand 
the category of public interest factors set out in the EA (to include the protection of 
R&D and the UK science base or to permit intervention in cases which are very 
clearly against the national interest) and importantly (a matter which received limited 
attention in the media coverage at the time), whether any such expansion, would be 
compatible with EU law.
77
  
At about the same time as the Pfizer/AstraZeneca case was being considered, a 
separate debate was raging in France over the risks (competition and otherwise) 
created by competing bids for train and gas turbine manufacturer. The French 
Government was so concerned about GE’s contemplated acquisition of Alstom’s 
energy business and to ensure that French companies should not become “prey”, that 
it promoted an alternative deal with German company Siemens and supported the 
enactment of a new decree on foreign investments expanding the circumstances in 
which investments in specified strategic sectors require authorisation from the 
Ministry of Economy.
78
 When GE’s bid eventually prevailed (in a very altered form) 
over that of Siemens’, the French Minister of Economy called for changes to EU 
competition law to allow the creation of “champions”.  
In section C it is seen that these scenarios described are not isolated or exceptional 
occurrences. Indeed, there is evidence
79
 that, rather than staying neutral, many 
Member States do rely on national law either (i) to prevent, oppose or control foreign 
merger attempts to acquire businesses registered in their state, especially previously 
SOEs operating in industries such as “the banking, defen[c]e, energy, postal, 
telecommunications, transport, and water sectors”80 and/or (ii)  to support domestic 
ones that create “national champions”81 or companies that are “too-big-to-be-
acquired”82 – through the grant of state aid or the promotion of national champions in 
 
75
  Including, it seems, the media-storm, the Government’s concerns and AstraZeneca’s shareholders 
unwillingness to engage with, and be persuaded by, the offers made, contrast AbbeVie’s proposed 
acquisition of Shire, which broadly sidestepped and avoided the same acute media and public 
scrutiny and political resistance. 
76
  Under UK rules, Pfizer was precluded from publicly bidding again for AstraZeneca until 
November 2014.  
77
  See infra C.2.d, especially n 148 and text. 
78
  This added to an already expansive list of sectors subject to the authorisation system, see supra n 
56. The decree was stated to be intended to encourage foreign investors to enter into alliances with 
French companies, rather than to acquire them. 
79
  S Dinc and I Erel, “Economic Nationalism in Mergers & Acquisitions” (2013) 68 Journal of 
Finance 2471 
80
  See infra section C and A Nourry and N Jung, “EU State Measures Against Foreign Takeovers: 
‘Economic Patriotism’ in All But Name” (2006) 2(2) Competition Policy International 99. See 
also M Harker, “Cross-Border Mergers in the EU: The Commission v The Member States” [2007] 
3(2) European Competition Journal 503 and Nourry and Jung, n 8. 
81
  See infra C.2.d and E. 
82
  Dinc and Erel, n 79. See also e.g., Nourry and Jung, n 80. 
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preference to foreign takeovers and the clearance of such transactions.
83
 Further, that 
government reactions against merger attempts are not pure posturing, but may have 
both a direct and/or indirect impact on the outcome of a case; both through decreasing 
the likelihood of an opposed merger’s success and deterring future foreign acquirers; 
“nationalist reactions by the governments affect the working of the market economy 
significantly”.84  
C. PROTECTING THE “PUBLIC INTEREST”: BALANCING 
NATIONAL AND EU LAW 
1. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EU AND NATIONAL LAW 
Given the broader powers of the Member States to take account of “non-competition” 
factors in their review of mergers and foreign investment, the capacity for such rules 
to derail transactions (which may have the potential to deliver efficiencies and benefit 
EU consumers) or to authorise the creation of national champions (which might 
threaten competition), the populist support that these public interest provisions often 
hold at the national level and the apparent willingness of some Member States at least 
to exercise their public interest powers, critical questions are: (1) when are Member 
States free to apply, or rely on, national law to prevent a foreign merger or acquisition 
or to support a domestic one on public interest grounds? (2) if a Member State can 
apply national law, can it apply such law freely or does EU law impose constraints on 
the adoption, or exercise, of such rules?; and (3) what happens if a Member State 
applies national law in breach of EU law – are the EU enforcement mechanisms 
sufficient to prevent violations and deter future ones? 
In relation to (1) and (2), EU law does not preclude Member States from adopting or 
maintaining in force merger, regulatory or foreign investment rules so long as those 
rules do not encroach on the EU’s exclusive competence within the fields of 
competition and FDI.
85
 Such laws must, however, be compatible with, and exercised 
in a manner which is compatible with, EU law. In particular, Member States must not: 
enact or maintain national law which contravenes the rules on freedom of 
establishment or free movement of capital (see section C.2); or apply national laws to 
a merger where, to do so, would infringe the Treaties or the EUMR (see section C.3). 
 
83
  Where competing bids are made for a national company a Government may be able to intervene 
through, e.g., the offering of preferential terms or aid to a domestic bidder and/or through clearing 
a domestic bid, see infra C.2.d.iii and C.3. One study has suggested that nationalistic responses 
within the EU are affected by sociological and political factors: in particular, by the existence of 
stronger nationalist sentiments in a state, by the affinity the people in the target country feel 
towards the acquirer’s country or the trust they have in it and by the strength or weakness of the 
government Dinc and Erel, n 79, s 7.  
84
  Ibid, see also Harker, n 80.  
85
  An interesting question, however, is exactly what EU’s exclusive competence over FDI requires 
and how far it precludes Member States from acting in this area. As Member States are only able 
to legislate in areas of EU exclusive competence where empowered by the EU to do so (see supra 
n 21), an important issue is whether exclusive competence precludes Member States from adopting 
any laws which limit FDI into their States. Although Reg 1219/2012, n 22, seeks to provide a 
framework for the continuing existence of BITs (which will be progressively replaced by 
agreements of the Union) and for management of the relationship of these international treatment 
with the Union’s investment policy, it makes no reference to Member States’ internal foreign 
investment (or merger) laws.   
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These rules impose significant constraints on the autonomy of the Member States in 
this sphere.  
In relation to (3), where a Member State does not adhere to these limitations, a 
number of mechanisms are in place to address infringements. Not only is a specific 
procedure set out in the EUMR (see section C.3),
86
 but the Commission may act under 
the general procedure set out in Articles 258 and 260 TFEU,
87
 which allows it to bring 
Member States which fail to fulfil their Treaty obligations before the Court of Justice 
(the “Court”) (see section D). In addition, Article 259 TFEU allows a Member State 
to bring an infringement proceedings against another Member State in breach of EU 
law (although this provision has seldom been used in practice) and private parties may 
be able to bring an action before a national court, for example, seeking a declaration 
that national law is incompatible with EU law and/or an injunction or damages in 
respect of a Member State’s “sufficiently serious” violation of EU law.  
2.  NATIONAL LAW MUST BE COMPATIBLE WITH EU LAW, IN PARTICULAR, THE 
RULES ON FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT AND THE FREE MOVEMENT OF 
CAPITAL 
a.   The internal market and the four freedoms: restrictions on establishment and 
capital movements 
By signing and ratifying the Treaties, the Member States are committed to the internal 
market “an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, 
persons, services and capital is ensured”.88 Consequently, all national laws contrary to 
those provisions are, even though adopted by democratically elected Governments, 
unlawful.  
In this section it is seen that the rules on freedom of establishment and free movement 
of capital, in particular, impose limitations on the ability of the Member States to 
adopt any laws which put obstacles in the path of mergers or foreign investment 
within their jurisdiction. The rules on establishment apply to rules relating to 
shareholdings giving rise “to a certain influence on the decisions of the company and 
help to determine its activities.”89 The capital rules apply to rules governing “those 
resources used for, or capable of, investment intended to generate revenue … for 
example, cash, bonds and other debt instruments, and shares”,90 including direct 
investment “in the form of participation in an undertaking through the holding of 
shares which confers the possibility of effectively participating in its management and 
control, and ‘portfolio’ investments, namely investments in the form of the acquisition 
of shares on the capital market solely with the intention of making a financial 
 
86
  EUMR, Art 21, see infra C.3.  
87
  See generally A Albors-Llorens, “Judicial Protection before the Court of Justice of the European 
Union” in C Barnard and S Peers (eds), European Union Law (Oxford University Press, 2014), 
261-264. 
88
  TFEU, Art 26. 
89
  L Flynn, “Free Movement of Capital” in Barnard and Peers, n 87, 451. 
90
  Ibid, 448.  
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investment without any intention to influence the management and control of the 
undertaking”.91 
As with the other rules governing free movement, the Court has interpreted both sets 
of provisions in a pro-integrationist way in order to give primacy to, and to facilitate 
the achievement of, these fundamental objectives of EU law. The pattern of the Court 
has been to interpret the concept of a “restriction” on any free movement broadly and 
the exceptions and justifications to the principle of free movement narrowly. This 
high impact approach means that almost all national rules affecting interstate trade
92
 
and creating barriers to the free movement of goods, services, persons, capital or to 
the right of establishment are liable to constitute a restriction, whether or not they are 
discriminatory (directly or indirectly) and specifically targeted at foreign goods, 
persons, services or investment.
93
 Indeed, the concept of a restriction on the free 
movement of capital has thus been interpreted to cover not only a total ban on 
investment but prior authorisation or approval systems, systems conferring a power on 
the state to oppose a merger or acquisition
94
 and any other measure which discourages 
or dissuades investment and affects access to the market even if the restriction does 
not discriminate as regards nationals and applies without distinction on grounds of 
nationality. The provision thus “goes beyond the mere elimination of unequal 
treatment, on grounds of nationality, as between operators on the financial market”.95 
Similarly, the concept of a restriction on establishment encompasses all measures 
“which prohibit, impede or render less attractive the exercise of that freedom”.96 
Consequently, EU control over national law is intense. The very existence of a 
restrictive rule is found to be incompatible with EU law unless the Member State can 
show that the measure is both (i) justifiable
97
 (either on the basis of one of the specific 
Treaty-based exceptions or the Court-recognised justifications—the overriding 
requirements of public interest (see further section (c)) and (ii) proportionate (see 
section (d)). Many national laws are thus brought within the scope of EU law and the 
burden is shifted to the Member States to justify their law; the careful and nuanced 
balancing of the EU goal against the sensitive social and public policy choices made 
by the Member States takes place within the forum of the exception and justification 
framework.  
 
91
  Case C-171/08, n 3, para. 49. Capital movements thus mean any of the following when carried out 
on a cross-border basis: FDI; real estate investments or purchases; securities investment; granting 
of loans and credits; and other operations with financial institutions, see the nomenclature annexed 
to Council Directive 88/361/EEC [1988] OJ L178/8. See also n 3. 
92
  Although the capital rules also apply where there is restriction on the free movement of capital 
between Member States and third countries, the Court has been more willing to recognise 
exceptions in this sphere, see infra C.2.d.ii. 
93
  See C Barnard, “Restricting the Restrictions: lessons for the EU from the US” [2009] 68(3) 
Cambridge Law Journal  563. 
94
  Case C-32/07, Commission v Italy [2009] ECR I-2291. 
95
  Case C-98/01, Commission v UK [2003] ECR I-4641, para 43. 
96
  Case C-442/02, CaixaBank France v Minsitère de l’Économie, des Finances et de l’Industrie 
[2004] ECR I-8961, para 11. 
97
  In some circumstances derogations may be provided for in harmonising EU legislation. 
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b.  Exceptions and justifications 
The Treaty-based exceptions to the free movement provisions are not identical for all 
of the four freedoms but have similarities and overlaps (all for example, set out public 
policy and public security grounds). In relation to capital, important Treaty exceptions 
are set out in Article 64(1), which permits grandfather restrictions – the continued 
application of direct investment restrictions with regard to third countries in existence 
at the end of 1993
98
 – and Article 65(1)(b) TFEU. The latter provides that Member 
States can take measures to prevent infringement of national law and regulations, in 
particular in the fields of taxation and prudential supervision of financial institutions 
and to protect themselves from proposed foreign investments which would pose a 
legitimate public policy or security concern, so long as the measure does not 
constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on the free 
movement of capital.
99
 In relation to establishment, the Treaty provides derogations 
on the grounds of public policy, public security and public health.
100
 More generally, 
Article 346(1)(b) TFEU provides that the Treaties shall not preclude the application 
by a Member State of measures “it considers necessary for the protection of the 
essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or trade 
in arms, munitions and war material”. 
Given the resemblance of some of the derogations set out in the capital and 
establishment rules to those set out in the other free movement provisions,
101
 the 
Court draws heavily on that jurisprudence in interpreting them where they correspond. 
It is seen in the sections below that the outcome of the individual cases are very fact 
specific but, as with these other derogations, the exceptions to the 
capital/establishment rules are “…interpreted strictly, so that their scope cannot be 
determined unilaterally by each Member State without any control by the Community 
institutions”;102 the measures must not pursue purely economic ends; persons affected 
must be afforded legal protection; and the principle of proportionality must be 
respected.
103
 In addition, the principle of legal certainty requires that clarity must be 
provided as to how the provisions will be exercised; individuals must be appraised of 
the extent of their rights and obligations.
104
  
The public policy or security exceptions set out in the Treaty overlap with the Court 
developed requirements of public interest which allow Member States to “pursue, in a 
non-discriminatory way, an objective in the public interest … if they observe the 
 
98 
 Or 1999 for Bulgaria, Estonia and Hungary, see also TFEU, Art 66. 
99
  TFEU, Art 63(3). 
100
  TFEU, Art 52. 
101
  The rules on free movement of goods (TFEU, Art 36) and free movement of capital set out the 
most expansive list of grounds for derogation. 
102
  See e.g., Case C-54/99, Association Eglise de Scientologie de Paris v The Prime Minister [2000] 
ECR I-1335, para 17, Case C-503/99, Commission v Belgium [2002] ECR I-4809, para 47, Case C-
483/99, Commission v France [2002] ECR I-4781, para 48 and Case  C-463/00, Commission v 
Spain [2003] ECR I-4581, para 72. 
103
  Case C-54/99, ibid, paras 17-18. 
104
  Ibid, para 22. 
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principle of proportionality, that is if the same result could not be achieved by other 
less restrictive measures”.105 The Court thus permits Member States to submit 
arguments on any public interest ground when justifying a rule which is not 
discriminatory; discriminatory rules, in contrast, must satisfy one of the Treaty 
exceptions and are harder to defend.
106
   
i. Public security or public order 
In a series of cases dealing with Golden Shares (where the Court confirmed that a 
holding of a golden share, which allows a State to control investment in, and 
management of, privatised strategic industries, constitutes a restriction
107
) the Court 
has clarified that a Member State might be justified in retaining influence over a 
shareholding in order to ensure a minimum supply of, or continuity in, “services in the 
public interest or strategic services”,108 such as post, petroleum, electricity and 
telecommunications.
109 
 
In Belgian Golden Shares,
110
 for example, the Court found, following Campus Oil,
111
 
that the measures in place, essentially allowing the authorities to oppose investment 
which was contrary to guidelines on the country’s energy policy, were suitable and 
did not go beyond what was necessary to obtain the objective of safeguarding energy 
supplies in the event of a crisis and so fell within the public interest and public 
security justification set out in Article 65 TFEU.
112
  
 
105 
 Cases C-519/99 etc Reisch [2002] ECR I-2157. 
106
  Although the distinction between discriminatory and non-discriminatory still stands, “it has 
become increasingly difficult to sustain the veracity of that distinction by reference to the case law 
practice”, see N Nic Shuibhne, “Exceptions to the free movement rules” in Barnard and Peers n 87, 
482. 
107
  Commencing with Case C-58/99 Commission v Italy [2000] ECR I-3811, see infra C.2.d.i (under 
these rules the Member State acted as a regulator in the guise of a market participant, see C 
Barnard, n 26).  
108
  Case C-367/98, Commission v Portugal [2002] ECR I-4731, paras 47-48, but not where acting 
purely to protect to that state’s own financial or economic interests, see infra nn 131-133 and text 
109
  In Case C-463/00, n 102, para 71, the Court held that neither commercial banking nor the supply of 
tobacco constituted public services, so golden shares held in these sectors would be incapable of 
justification, but see also infra C.2.b.ii. In 1997 the Commission published a Communication 
setting out its view that golden shares conferring special rights which discriminated against foreign 
investors would automatically infringe the Treaty, whilst non-discriminatory measures would be 
permitted only provided they were proportionate and pursued stable and objective criteria in the 
general interest, see Communication of the Commission on Certain Legal Aspects Concerning 
Intra-EU Investment [1997] OJ C220/15. 
110
  Case C-383/98, Commission v Belgium [2002] ECR I-4809. 
111
  Case 72/83, Campus Oil [1984] ECR 2727. 
112
  Case C-383/98, n 110, para 49. The scheme required the authorities to oppose rather than to 
authorise the arrangements and so preserved “the principle of respect for the decision-making 
autonomy of the undertakings”. An ex post facto opposition system is less restrictive than a system 
of prior approval and is more likely to be found to be proportionate, infra C.2.c. In sum, the 
Belgian legislation was targeted as to when it applied and involved a form of targeted intervention 
by the public authorities. Intervention was limited, any decision had to be supported by a formal 
statement of reasons and was subject to effective review by the courts. 
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In French Golden Shares,
113
 in contrast, the Court rejected the French Government’s 
argument that its golden share in petroleum company, Elf-Aquitaine (requiring the 
Minister for Economic Affairs to give prior authorisation before an individual was 
entitled to hold share capital exceeding specified ceilings), was necessary to protect 
public security and to prevent an interruption of supply of petroleum products which 
were of fundamental economic and strategic importance to the country. Although the 
Court was willing to accept (again in line with long-standing jurisprudence such as 
Campus Oil) that security of energy supplies comes within the scope of public 
security, it stressed that the public security exception was applicable only if there was 
a “genuine and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest to society”.114 It 
had to be ascertained therefore whether the rules at issue provided assurance within 
the Member State concerned, in the event of a genuine and serious threat, that there 
would be a minimum supply of the services and do not go beyond what is necessary 
for that purpose. On the facts, it held that the French legislation provided no precise 
objective and non-discriminatory criteria for authorisation or for determining how the 
national interest would affect the decision. Without such guidance on the objective 
circumstances in which prior authorization would be granted or refused, the court 
considered that the system would be contrary to the principle of legal certainty and 
would negate the principles of free movement completely. Specific, objective 
circumstances in which discretion may be exercised to protect the public interest 
identified were thus required.  
The cases thus support the view that overly-broad public interest tests will lead to a 
lack of transparency and coherence in decision-taking and create uncertainty for 
investors which will deter exercise of free movement rights.
115
 
ii. Other public policy justifications 
The list of Court-recognised public interest exceptions are not closed (it is open-
ended). Nonetheless, a State will have to do more than make generic references to the 
strategic importance of an industry. There are a large number of cases dealing with 
public policy justifications which have been reviewed by the EU Courts in the free 
movement context. That case-law suggests that, in free movement of capital and 
freedom of establishment cases, measures designed to protect the following might be 
acceptable:
116
  
 the values of a state or civil liberties (such as the promotion of EU R&D,117 
maintaining press diversity,
118
 the risk of seriously undermining the financial 
 
113
  Case 483/99, n 102.  
114
  Ibid, para 48. 
115
  See also supra B.2.  
116
  See Barnard, n 26, Chaps 13 and 15. 
117
  See Case C-39/04, Laboratoires Fournier [2005] ECR I-2057, para 23 and further discussion of 
the case infra n 148 and Case C-10/10, Commission v Austria [2011] ECR I-5389. 
118
  Case C-368/95, Vereinigte Familiapress Zeitungsverlags-und vertriebs GmbH v Heinrich Bauer 
Verlag [1997] ECR I-3689. 
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balance of the social security system,
119
 environmental protection,
120
 or the need 
to achieve land and country planning objectives in relation to the acquisition of 
land, such as maintaining a permanent population or preserving agricultural 
communities);
121
  
 third parties (such as the protection of public health, prudential rules,122 creditors, 
minority shareholders, investors, workers,
123
 the reputation or stability of the 
banking sector,
124
 the need to ensure road safety
125
 or consumer protection
126
); or  
 socio-cultural matters (such as the survival of small firms127 or the promotion of 
tourism
128
).  
In each case, the Court will scrutinise the legislation carefully and its objectives to 
determine whether the Member State is really acting to protect such an interest (rather 
than imposing a disguised restriction on trade). In practice, therefore, although the 
 
119
  Case C-158/96, Kohll [1998] ECR I-1931. 
120
  Case 302/86, Commission v Denmark [1988] ECR 4607, para 9 and Case C-309/02, Radlberger 
Getränkegesellschaft and S Spitz [2004] ECR I-11763, para 75. 
121
  Case C-302/97, Konle [1999] ECR I-3099. 
122
  Case C-39/11, VBV 7 June 2012. 
123
  Case C-112/05, Commission v Germany (VW) [2007] ECR I-8995. 
124
  Case C-384/93, Alpine Investments BV v Minister van Financien [1995] ECR I-1141, para 44. See 
also Commission Press Release IP/13/298. 
125
  Case C-55/93, van Schaik [1994] ECR I-4837, para 19 and Case C-54/05, Commission v  Finland 
[2007] ECR I-2473, para 40. 
126
  See e.g., Case 220/83, Commission v France [1986] ECR 3663, para 20 and Case 
C-393/05, Commission v Austria [2007] ECR I-10195, para 52. 
127
  Case C-464/05, Geurts and Vogten [2007] ECR I-9325, paras 25-27 (“it is conceivable that such 
considerations, in particular those connected with the survival of small and medium-sized 
undertakings and the maintenance of employment in them, may, under certain circumstances and 
conditions, be acceptable justifications for national legislation providing for a tax benefit for 
natural or legal persons,” but on the facts the Belgian Government had “not been able to show the 
need to limit the exemption at issue to ‘family’ undertakings which maintain a given number of 
jobs in the territory of the Member State concerned. In the present case, in relation to the objective 
of preventing inheritance tax from jeopardising the continuation of family undertakings, and 
therefore the jobs which they bring, undertakings having their seat in another Member State are in 
a situation comparable to that of undertakings established in the first Member State”). 
128
  Case C-338/09, Yellow Cab Verkehrsbetriebs GmbH v Landeshauptmann von Wien [2010] ECR I-
13927, paras 50-51 (in this case the Court accepted that the operation of a bus service may serve an 
objective in the general interest, such as “promotion of tourism, road safety by channelling tourist 
traffic to set routes, or protection of the environment by offering a collective mode of transport as 
an alternative to individual means of transport” but that the objective “of ensuring the profitability 
of a competing bus service, as a reason of a purely economic nature, cannot, in accordance with the 
settled case-law, constitute an overriding reason in the public interest”, relying on Case 
C-384/08, Attanasio Group [2010] ECR I-2055, para 55). 
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Court may accept a potential justification in principle, it may find on the facts that it 
has not been established that the measure was designed to achieve that objective.
129
 
iii. Purely economic reasons 
In examining public interest justifications, the Court has consistently stressed that 
purely economic justifications, or financial concerns cannot be relied on to 
substantiate a restriction of a fundamental freedom. Such justifications would 
undermine the internal market objective. “Extending equal opportunities to the 
nationals of other Member States … costs money”.130 In Commission v Portugal131 
the Court reiterated that unless the justification clearly fell within one of the specified 
exceptions in relation to tax law under Article 65, “the general financial interests of a 
Member State cannot constitute adequate justification. It is settled case-law that 
economic grounds can never serve as justification for obstacles prohibited by the 
Treaty … ”.132 Consequently, it rejected the Portuguese Government justifications 
based on economic policy objectives, “namely choosing a strategic partner, 
strengthening the competitive structure of the market concerned or modernising and 
increasing the efficiency of means of production.”133 As such interests were held not 
to constitute a valid justification for restrictions on the fundamental freedom 
concerned the Court held that the prior authorisation system created by the Portuguese 
golden share did not comply with the freedom of capital rules and that by adopting 
and maintaining in force the legislation the Portuguese Republic had failed to comply 
with its Treaty obligations.
134
 
In other cases the court has also rejected economic objectives raised, for example, the 
rationalisation of services provided by service stations,
135
 promoting the economy of a 
country by encouraging investment in companies with their seat there,
136
 measures 
designed to prevent the reduction of tax revenue,
137
 measures designed to achieve 
industrial peace
138
 or protecting the competitive viability of a business). The 
distinctions drawn in the cases are fine ones, however, and at times justifications 
accepted “come close to the very type of economic justifications which the Court has 
rejected in other cases”.139 
 
129
  See e.g., Case C-112/05, n 123 and supra n 127. 
130
  Nic Shuibhne, n 106, 487.  
131
  Case C-367/98, n 108. 
132
  Ibid, para 52 
133
  Ibid. 
134
  Ibid, paras 53-54. 
135
  Case C-384/08, n 128. See also Case C-338/09, Yellow Cab, n 128 
136
  Case C-35/98 Verkoiijn [2000] ECR I-4071. 
137
  Case C-464/02, Commission v Denmark (company vehicles) [2005] ECR I-7929. 
138
  C-398/95, SETTG v Ypourgos Ergasias [1997] ECR I-3091. 
139
  Barnard, n 26, 533.  
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c. Proportionality 
Even if a legitimate justification is raised, the Court demands that the measures are 
proportionate to the aim. For example, the Court has consistently taken the view that 
an ex ante authorisation system will be proportionate only if an ex post objection or 
declaration system or other measures is not sufficient to achieve the objective 
pursued. The proportionality principle is thus applied rigorously to ensure that 
derogations from the free movement principles are limited to what is absolutely 
required; where alternatives exist, the measure chosen should be objectively the least 
restrictive to achieve the end pursued. 
d.  Implications for the Member States’ merger control, foreign investment or 
regulatory laws 
i. Obstacles to intra-Union cross-border mergers 
The discussion in the sections above has important implications for the categories of 
national law discussed in section B above. Member States may not adopt, maintain in 
force or apply national laws which contravene establishment and/or capital rules.  
The wide interpretation adopted of a “restriction” will it seems capture most of the 
rules described which require prior approval or authorisation for, or provide the 
opportunity to oppose or put other obstacles in the path of, a foreign merger, 
acquisition of shares or other investment in a company even if they are not 
specifically targeted at foreign investors. This conclusion is supported by the 
approach of the Court in the Golden Share cases. In UK Golden Shares,
140
 for 
example, the Court held that rules in a privatised company’s articles of association 
which prevented any investor acquiring shares in that firm carrying the right to more 
than 15 per cent of the votes without the consent of the Government, did restrict both 
the freedom of capital and freedom of establishment even though they applied without 
distinction to both UK residents and non-residents.
141
 As they affected a person 
wishing to acquire a shareholding, they were liable to deter the access of investors 
from other Member States to the market and from making investments.  
In Church of Scientology
142
 the Court also held that a French rule subjecting foreign 
investment to a prior authorisation system constituted a restriction on the free 
movement of capital, in Commission v Germany (VW)
143
 the Court held that a law 
capping the voting rights of shareholders and giving federal and state authorities 
power to participate in the activities of the supervisory board constituted a restriction 
and in Commission v Kingdom of Spain
144
 the Court upheld the Commission’s view 
that Spanish rules requiring purchasers of more than a 10% shareholding in a 
 
140
  Case C-98/01, n 95, see also supra n 107. 
141
  See also e.g., Case C-367/98, n 108. 
142 
 Case C-54/99, n 102. 
143
  Case C-112/05, n 123. Proceedings brought by the Commission, seeking an order against Germany 
to pay financial penalties for failure to comply with this judgment were, however, dismissed; see 
Case C-95/12, Commission v Germany 22 October 2013. 
144
  Case C-207/07, [2008] ECR I-111. 
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regulated entity to gain authorisation from the Spanish energy regulator were both 
liable to dissuade investors in other Member States from capital investments which 
would render the free movement of capital illusory and constituted a restriction on the 
right of establishment.
145
 In Polish banks, the Commission also took the view that 
privatisation agreements prohibiting purchasers of shares from buying shares in 
competing banks in order “to safeguard the competitiveness of the Polish market in 
banking services”146 violated the free movement rules.  
Laws imposing “restrictions” to establishment or on the movement of capital must 
therefore be analysed to determine whether they are justified and proportionate (prior 
authorisation systems are likely to attract careful scrutiny).  
It has been seen that the Court has accepted that a relatively wide-range of clearly 
articulated public interest justifications may be relied upon by Member States. Many 
of the examples of Member States’ laws discussed in section B above, appear to be 
designed to counter genuine and serious threats to legitimate public security or public 
policy objectives which are prima-facie justifiable, for example, prudential rules, rules 
designed to safeguard the plurality of the media or to protect national security, public 
order, defence or the security of supply of energy or transport. In addition, although 
there is no authority on this point, it seems that merger control regimes, providing for 
economics-based competition assessments, which impose obstacles to the right to 
establishment or free movement of capital are likely, where non-discriminatory, to be 
justifiable by reference to an overriding reason relating to the public interest on the 
basis that they are designed to protect the competitive structure of the market.
147
  
Some of the laws however, appear to be more problematic. The jurisprudence makes 
it clear that rules designed solely to protect economic or financial interests of a 
Member State (such as employment in that State or the protection of a national 
industry or the retention of a specific R&D base within that individual Member 
State
148
) or which provide a generic ban on investment in companies operating in a 
broad category of sectors on grounds which are not clearly articulated (so the specific 
public interest to be protected is not identifiable) are not permitted.
149
 Further, that if 
 
145
  See infra C.3.b. 
146
  See IP/06/276, discussed further infra C.3.b. 
147
  But see also infra C.3 (such national merger laws may not ordinarily be applied when the 
Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to assess the transaction under the EUMR). 
148
  Although EU law permits action to protect identified concerns of public interest, which includes it 
seems the promotion of R&D in EU industry, the Court stressed in Case C-39/04, Laboratoires 
Fournier [2005] ECR I-2057, the promotion of R&D “cannot justify a national measure such as 
that at issue in the main proceedings, which refuses the benefit of a tax credit for any research not 
carried out in the Member State concerned. Such legislation is directly contrary to the objective of 
the Community policy on research and technological development which... is, inter alia, 
‘strengthening the scientific and technological bases of Community industry and encouraging it to 
become more competitive at international level’...”. See also TFEU, Art 179. 
149
  The legality of the broad French foreign investment decree adopted in 2014 (discussed supra nn 
55-56 and text), has consequently been questioned, see e.g., A Gaudemet, “Investissements 
étrangers en France: le décret Montebourg est-il viable?”, available at http://www.affiches-
parisiennes.com/investissements-etrangers-en-france-le-decret-montebourg-est-il-viable-
4271.html. At the time of its adoption the Commission also indicated that it would review it 
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measures are too broad, they cannot be saved by a Member State committing not to 
operate the rules in a way which is incompatible with EU law; rather the mere 
existence of such rules creates uncertainty about the ability to exercise the right of 
free movement.
150
 In Church of Scientology
151
 the Court held that a system of prior 
authorisation for every FDI which represents a threat to public policy and public 
security without further definition, was contrary to the rules on free movement of 
capital. “Such a lack of precision does not enable individuals to be apprised of the 
extent of their rights and obligations deriving from Article [63 TFEU]. That being so, 
the system established is contrary to the principle of legal certainty.” National law 
must therefore provide clarity as to when a restriction will be applied and provide 
comfort that it will not be applied in a discriminatory manner.  
ii. Free movement of capital and third countries 
The cases discussed in the sections above have principally involved rules restricting 
inter-state trade or movement, and the removal of rules which create barriers to the 
creation of the internal market. It has already been noted, however, that a distinctive 
feature of the capital rules is that they also apply to restrictions on the movement of 
capital between Member States and third countries. Two vital questions
152
 arising 
where national rules apply only to investors from third countries, or are invoked 
against them, are, therefore, (i) whether it is the freedom of establishment and/or free 
movement of capital rules which apply, since only the latter apply to third country 
investors; and (ii) where the capital rules are applicable, whether they operate in the 
same way in this context.   
There is clearly a potential overlap between the capital and establishment rules as 
“freedom to move certain types of capital is, in practice, a precondition of the 
effective exercise of ... the right of establishment”.153 The case-law, however, has not 
always been entirely clear as to whether, and if so when, one set of rules applies to the 
exclusion of the other, or whether, and if so when, both apply.  
In a number of cases the two provisions have been applied together leading to a 
convergence of the tests to be applied. In some more recent cases, however, the Court 
has taken account of the purpose of the national legislation in determining whether it 
should be the establishment or capital provisions which apply. In Scheunemann,
154
 for 
example, the Court held that national legislation which applies only to “shareholdings 
enabling the holder to exert a definite influence over a company’s decisions and 
 
carefully to ensure it did not cover a field so vast that any takeover would be subject to 
authorisation (which would amount to protectionism). See also e.g., the UK Industry Act, n 61 and 
supra n 47. 
150
  Case C-367/98, n 108. 
151
  See e.g., Case C-54/99, n 102, paras 21-23. 
152
  But see also supra n 85. 
153
  Case 203/80, Criminal Proceedings against Guerrino Casati [1981] ECR 2595. See also TFEU, 
Art 65(2) clarifying that the provisions on capital and payments are without prejudice to the 
applicability of restrictions on the right of establishment which are compatible with the Treaty. 
154
  Case C-31/11, Marianne Scheunemann v Finanzamt Bremerhaven, 19 July 2012. 
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determine its activities is covered by the Treaty provisions on freedom of 
establishment. On the other hand, national provisions which apply to shareholdings 
acquired solely with the intention of making a financial investment, with no intention 
of influencing the management and control of the undertaking, must be examined 
exclusively in the light of the free movement of capital ...”.155 This suggests that in 
order to determine which freedom applies, it is necessary to examine whether the 
shareholding referred to in the relevant national legislation is sufficient to enable the 
shareholder to exert a definite influence over the company’s decisions and to 
determine its activities.  
In Scheunemann, the Court thus accepted that as the legislation at issue in the main 
proceedings primarily affected freedom of establishment, it fell solely within the 
scope of the Treaty provisions concerning that freedom.
156
 “If it were to be found that 
such a national measure has restrictive effects on the free movement of capital, those 
effects would have to be seen as an unavoidable consequence of a restriction on 
freedom of establishment and would not justify an independent examination of that 
measure in the light of the Treaty provisions on the free movement of capital ...”.157 
The rules on capital did not thus apply and as the case related to a shareholding in a 
company which had its registered office in a third country, neither did the rules on 
establishment.  Conversely, in Portuguese Golden Shares, the Court held that in so far 
as the national measures, which precluded both direct and portfolio investment, 
entailed restrictions on freedom of establishment, such restrictions were a direct 
consequence of the obstacles to the free movement of capital. As an infringement of 
the capital rules had been established there was no need for a separate examination of 
the measures at issue under the establishment rules.
158
 
In another case, however, Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation v 
Commissioners of Inland Revenue (FII No 2),
159
 the Court suggested that the hard 
division between freedom of establishment and capital may only be relevant to intra-
EU situations, at least in certain tax cases.
160
 Thus the capital provisions might apply 
not only to portfolio investments but also to cases of decisive influence where third 
country relations are at stake.  
 
155
  Ibid, para 23. 
156
  The national rule applied to a shareholding of 25% in the capital of a company which gave the 
shareholder a blocking minority in the context of important decisions affecting the company. 
157
  Case C-31/11, n 154, paras 28-30, relying on Case C-464/05, n 127, para 16. See also Case C-
524/04, Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation v Commissioners of Inland Revenue 
[2007] ECR I-2107.  
158
  Case C-367/98, n 108, paras 79-80. In Case C-157/05, Winfried L. Holböck v Finanzamt Salzburg-
Land [2007] ECRI-4051, however, the Court held that where the case relates to legislation which 
does not only apply to stakes conferring a definite influence on a company’s decision the Court 
may apply both. 
159
  Case C-35/11, 13 November 2013. 
160
  See C Barnard and J Snell, “Free movement of legal persons and the provision of services” in 
Barnard and Peers, n 87, 411-412. 
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Where the capital rules do apply, the Court clarified in its important ruling in Re A,
161
 
that the concept of a restriction on the freedom of capital is interpreted in the same 
way whether the alleged restriction is on capital movements between Member States 
or between Member States and third countries. In so finding the Court denied the 
arguments of Germany and the Netherlands that such a holding would open up the EU 
market to non-EU/EEA investors without being able to guarantee equal liberalisation 
from such countries. Measures which impose obstacles to investment from third 
countries will therefore be prohibited by the rules on the free movement of capital 
unless a public interest justification, or statutory exception, can be relied upon. It is 
here, however, that Member States are currently afforded greater autonomy and 
latitude. Not only does Article 64(1) permit “grandfather” provisions,162 but the Court 
has accepted that, given the different legal framework governing relations between 
Member States and between Member States and third countries, a restriction on free 
movement of capital might be acceptable in situations involving third countries when 
it would not be permitted in an intra-Union situation; the exceptions and public policy 
justifications might be interpreted more flexibly.
163
 Given the relatively sparse volume 
of cases in this area, however, the exact scope of the permissible exceptions and 
justifications in relation to restrictions operating against third country investors and 
the extent to which the Commission would be prepared to bring proceedings in these 
cases is not entirely clear. It seems likely that both the Court and the Commission will 
proceed with caution in this delicate area. Further, the debate on this issue is likely to 
intensify if third countries, such as the US, Canada and China, become more willing 
to rely on foreign investment or other rules to block foreign M&A in their 
jurisdictions.   
The position, at least in relation to some third countries, might also change if the EU 
negotiates BITs or trade agreements with investment chapters with some third 
countries; these international treaties would then provide a framework governing 
relations between Member States and those third countries.
164
 It has been seen that it 
is possible that some of these agreements may incorporate pre-establishment 
obligations requiring each party to accord no less favourable treatment to investors of 
the other party than that it accords, in like circumstances, either to its own investors (a 
“national treatment” obligation) or to investors from other third countries. If such an 
obligation were included within an EU negotiated agreement, it would consequently 
require a Member State to open a sector which is open to national investors or 
investors from other third countries to foreign investors from the partner State unless 
an exception applies, for example, for national security or certain excluded sectors; 
this would clearly prevent EU Member States from acting purely (except in excluded 
sectors) to support and promote growth of domestic enterprises. As negotiations over 
these new trade Treaties progresses, the question of how they apply to pre-
 
161
  Case C-101/05, A [2007] ECR I-11531, para 38 See more recently Case C-282/12, Itelcar 3 
October 2013, para 30. 
162
  See supra n 98 and TFEU, Arts 64(2)(3), 65(4), 66 and 75. 
163
  See e.g., Case C-101/05, n 161 and Case C-446/04, Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation v 
Inland Revenue Commissioners [2006] ECR I-11753, especially para 121. 
164
  See supra n 30. In so far as the capital provisions apply, the BITs would presumably operate as 
harmonising measures which would shape the scope of the derogations. 
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establishment investment will consequently also be of vital importance to the 
autonomy of the Member States to limit investment from third countries.  
iii. Creation of national champions 
The establishment and capital rules are triggered only by restrictions. They do not, 
therefore, appear to preclude a Member State from exercising regulatory approval of 
mergers between domestic companies on public interest grounds (as is permitted in a 
number of Member States
165
), even if the application of such rules might result in the 
creation of a national champion at the expense of competition and the interest of 
consumer welfare within the EU. Regulatory approval in this way will be 
impermissible, however, if the merger transaction falls within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Commission under the EUMR (see section C.3 below). 
3. NATIONAL LAW MUST NOT BE APPLIED IN BREACH OF THE EUMR 
a. Introduction 
In addition to ensuring that they do not adopt or maintain in force laws contrary to the 
rules on free movement of capital and the freedom of establishment, Member States 
must also ensure that when applying national law to a merger transaction they do not 
infringe these principles or other EU law. In particular they must respect the 
jurisdictional provisions set out in the EUMR. Broadly, the EUMR allocates 
jurisdiction to appraise concentrations between the Commission and the Member 
States; large-scale concentrations which have a “Community” – or EU – dimension 
(based on certain turnover thresholds)
166
 are as a general rule appraised exclusively by 
the Commission.  
A Member States may not therefore ordinarily apply national legislation on 
competition to concentrations with an EU dimension; such concentrations benefit 
from a “one-stop shop” within the EU – an exclusive competition law assessment by 
the Commission – and should not be subject to a second control under national 
competition law. Two important exceptions to this principle apply, however. First, 
Member States may apply national competition law and take measures which are 
necessary “to safeguard or restore effective competition on the market concerned” 
where a concentration affects, or threatens to affect, competition in a “distinct market” 
and the merger, or aspects of it, are referred to it by the Commission under specific 
procedures set out in Article 4(4) or Article 9 EUMR.
167
 Second, Member States may 
 
165
  E.g., in Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and the UK, see supra B.2. 
166
  EU dimension is assessed, under tests set out in EUMR, Art1(2)(3), by reference to the turnover of 
the parties involved; the tests are designed to draw bright lines and to be relatively simple and easy 
to apply. A feature of both Art 1(2) and (3) is that even if the stipulated global and EU turnover 
and other thresholds are met, EU jurisdiction is denied if the proviso applies—if each of the 
undertakings concerned in the merger achieves more than two-thirds of its EU turnover within one 
and the same Member State (the “two-thirds” rule), see infra E. The general rule is that 
concentrations without an EU dimension are assessed exclusively under national law; the 
Commission cannot apply either the EUMR or Articles 101 or 102 to the transaction, EUMR, Art 
21(1), but see Arts 4(5) and 22. 
167
  EUMR, Arts 9(8) and 4(4). Broadly, these provisions allow the notifying parties or a Member State 
to request referral of a concentration with an EU dimension, or aspects of it, to a Member State, 
see e.g., Jones and Sufrin, n 31, 1159-1164.  
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act to protect legitimate interests, not protected by the EUMR itself (i.e., “non-
competition” interests).  
b. Protecting Legitimate Interests: Article 21(4) EUMR 
i. The elements of Article 21(4) 
Article 21(4) provides that even where the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction 
over a concentration, “Member States may take appropriate measures to protect 
legitimate interests other than those taken into consideration by this Regulation and 
compatible with the general principles and other provisions of [EU] law”. It clarifies 
that “public security, plurality of the media and prudential rules” are to be recognised 
as legitimate interests (“recognised interests”), and are compatible with EU law so 
long as the measures are proportionate and non-discriminatory. Actions adopted to 
protect these recognised interests may be adopted and enter into force without prior 
communication to, and approval from, the Commission.
168
 In cases of uncertainty as 
to whether one of the recognised legitimate interests in Article 21(4) applies, or 
whether such measures conform with EU law,
169
 however, or where a Member State 
wishes to act to protect “[a]ny other public interest”, the interest must “be 
communicated to the Commission by the Member State concerned and shall be 
recognised by the Commission after an assessment of its compatibility with the 
general principles and other provisions of EU law before the measures referred to 
above may be taken. The Commission shall inform the Member State concerned of its 
decision within 25 working days of that communication”.170  
ii. Implications for the Member States’ merger control, foreign investment or 
regulatory rules 
A number of features of Article 21(4) are observed which are of particular 
significance to the ability of Member States to act under national law in EU merger 
cases.  
First, the Commission’s view is that Article 21(4) only permits a Member State to 
prohibit a concentration, or make it subject to additional conditions. This view is 
consistent with case-law holding that the principle of supremacy of EU law precludes 
a Member State from authorising a transaction which has been prohibited under the 
EU Treaty competition provisions.
171
 A Member State cannot, therefore, as it can 
 
168
  Case M.4197, E.ON/Endesa (2006), para 25. 
169
  See Case M.4197, ibid, para 56. Case M.1616, BSCH/A.Champaliaud (1999), para 66. 
170
  Case M.1616, ibid, para 27. 
171
  The principle of supremacy establishes that national law can be applied only in so far as its 
application does not “prejudice the full and uniform application of [EU] law or the effects of 
measures taken or to be taken to implement it”. Consequently, it has been held that neither an NCA 
nor a national court can authorise an agreement or conduct prohibited by EU law under national 
competition law or under any other provision of national law or according to a national act, see 
Case 14/68, Walt Wilhelm v Bundeskartellamt [1969] ECR 1, paras 5-9. See also Commission’s 
“Notes on Council Regulation 4064/89”, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/notes_reg4064_89_en.pdf and J Faull and A 
Nikpay (eds), The EU Law of Competition (Oxford University Press, 3rd edn, 2014), 5.289. 
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where the EUMR does not apply,
172
 rely on Article 21(4) to authorise a merger on 
public interest grounds.  
Second, although Article 21(4) appears, at first blush, to accord considerable latitude 
to Member States in determining whether any interest they wish to protect pursuant to 
it is “legitimate”, in fact, on closer inspection, it limits the Member States’ autonomy 
considerably and only permits intervention in limited circumstances. First, it requires 
that if the interest to be protected is not one of the recognised interests, that it is a 
“public” interest which is not protected by the EUMR itself (it is not a “competition” 
interest
173
). Second, and crucially, it requires that measures taken to protect legitimate 
interests must be compatible with EU law (which includes Articles 49 and 63 TFEU). 
It has been seen that the establishment and capital provisions, impose substantial 
constraints on the ability of a Member State to prohibit, submit to conditions or 
prejudice investments through shareholding, mergers and acquisitions. An 
inextricable and important link thus exists between “legitimate interests” within the 
meaning of Article 21(4) and the exceptions and justifications to the free movement of 
capital and freedom of establishment rules. If the “restriction” on capital and/or 
establishment envisaged by the Member State under Article 21(4) does not fall within 
one of the exceptions or justifications to the relevant free movement rules it will not 
be permitted under Article 21(4). Either the legislation itself and/or the exercise of the 
measure will be incompatible with EU law; the legitimate interest pursued must 
therefore constitute a valid public interest justification.  
The close link between the concept of legitimate interest under Article 21(4) and the 
exceptions and justifications to the free movement provisions is reinforced by the fact 
that the recognised interests include “public security”, “plurality of the media” and 
“prudential rules”, concepts whose specific meaning have been developed under EU 
free movement law. In a number of cases the Commission has thus accepted that 
Member States may take action to protect: defence policy or military security
174
 (the 
Member States are also have a general right set out in Article 346 TFEU
175
 to act to 
 
172
  See supra C.2.d.iii. 
173
  See discussion of the Polish banks case, infra especially n 193 and text. 
174
  See e.g., Case M.1858, Thomson CSF/Racal (II) (2000) (impacting on defence electronics 
markets), Case M.336, IBM France/CGI (1993) (involving IT businesses, including hardware, 
software and services), Case M.3418, General Dynamics/ Alvis (2004) (involving British armoured 
combat vehicles), Case M.3559, Finmeccanical/Agusta-Westland (2004), Case M.3720, BAE 
Systems/ AMS (2005) (involving defence and commercial aerospace systems and BAE’s 
communications and avionics business) and Case M.4561, GE/Smiths Aerospace (2007) (involving 
Smiths Groups’ aerospace division).  
175
  Set out supra C.2.b. EUMR, recital 19 makes it clear that the regulation (and in particular Article 
21(4)) does not affect a Member State’s ability to act under this TFEU, Art 346. A list of arms 
referred to by TFEU, Art 346 was adopted by the Council (Decn 255/58), see V Rose and D Bailey 
(eds) Bellamy & Child: European Union Law of Competition (Oxford University Press, 7th edn, 
2014), Vol II, A7). When acting under TFEU, Art 346, Member States, instead of acting in 
addition to the Commission under the EUMR (as is the case under Article 21(4) EUMR), have 
generally instructed firms not to notify the exclusively military aspects of the deal to the 
Commission at all, see e.g., Case M.528, British Aerospace/VSEL (1994) and Case M.529, 
GEC/VSEL (1994). If the Commission considers that a Member State is making improper use of 
these powers it may take the matter directly before the Court under TFEU, Art 348.  
 Page 33 
protect national security issues); maintenance of diversified sources of information, 
plurality of opinion and a multiplicity of views in media markets;
176
 or safeguarding 
“prudential rules” (aiming to ensure, for example, capital adequacy requirements 
(solvency) and the good repute and honesty of those running the company 
concerned).
177
 By analogy with the free movement rules, it also seems that public 
security would encompass proportionate measures to counter a genuine and 
sufficiently serious threat to the security of supplies of a product or service which is of 
fundamental importance for the existence of, or survival of those in, that Member 
State (such as oil, gas, water, electricity, telecommunications)
178
 or of vital or 
essential interest for the population’s health.179 
Article 21(4) does not therefore, it seems, confer new rights on Member States, but 
articulates their inherent powers to impose, subject to EU law, obstacles to 
investment, or make it subject to additional conditions and requirements, on the basis 
of public interests grounds. In this case, however, the public interest grounds must be 
other than those covered by the EUMR.
180
  
Third, in order to prevent Member States acting autonomously in this area and to 
ensure the effet utile of the EUMR and Article 21(4), non-recognised interests must be 
notified to the Commission; the notification and standstill procedure thus prohibits 
Member States from implementing any such measure until the Commission 
determines whether the interest is legitimate.  
Fourth, a particular problem which has occurred in a number of cases is that in spite 
of the notification and standstill obligation there are instances in which a Member 
State has acted without notifying the Commission, in circumstances where the 
Commission believes that the conditions of Article 21(4) are not satisfied and so that 
the Member States is acting in breach of that provision, the EUMR and other EU law. 
An important ruling therefore is Portuguese Republic v Commission,
181
 where the 
Court confirmed the Commission’s view that, even if no communication is made by 
the Member State to the Commission, the Commission is, still entitled to adopt a 
 
176
  See e.g., Case M.423, Newspaper Publishing (1984) and Case M.5932, NewsCorp/BSkyB (2010), 
paras 304-309. 
177
  See the Commission’s “Notes on Council Regulation 4064/89”, n 171 (prudential interests should 
be understood to cover e.g., measures to ensure the good repute of individuals managing such 
undertakings, the honesty of transactions and the rules of solvency) and M.1724, 
BSCH/A.Champalimaud (1999), para 36 (EU harmonising provisions should also be taken into 
account to determine the EU notion of prudential interest which should include interests protected 
by harmonising directives). See also e.g., Case M.759, Sun Alliance/Royal Insurance (1996), paras 
16-17. 
178
  See Case 72/83, n 111. In Case M.567, Lyonnaise des Eaux SA/Northumbrian Water Group (1996) 
for example, the Commission accepted, following a notification from the UK, the right for the UK 
authorities to apply the provisions of the Water Industry Act to the concentration to protect public 
security. Contrast Case M.1346, Edf/London Electricity (1999) (no need for a derogation under 
Article 21(4) IP/99/49). 
179
  See the Commission’s “Notes on Council Regulation 4064/89”, n 171, and discussion supra 
section C.2.b.  
180
  See supra n 147. 
181
  Case C-42/01, Portuguese Republic v Commission [2004] ECR I-6079. 
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decision under Article 21 assessing whether measures taken by a Member State are 
compatible with Article 21(4) and requiring a Member State to withdraw measures 
which it decides are not. This means that the Commission is not obliged, immediately, 
to have recourse to procedures set out in Article 258 TFEU. Otherwise, Member 
States could easily avoid the scrutiny of the Commission by not communicating such 
measures and national measures could irretrievably prejudice a merger with an EU 
dimension.
182
 In practice therefore, where the Commission believes that a Member 
State has violated the exclusivity provisions of the EUMR, it communicates this 
preliminary view to the Member State and gives it a chance to respond, before issuing 
an Article 21 decision. Only if a Member State fails to comply with that decision, will 
the Commission have to start the procedure under Article 258.  
The Commission has used this procedure in a number of cases where it has taken the 
view that a Member State is imposing obstacles to a merger on grounds which are not 
designed to protect legitimate interests. For example, it went into (lengthy) battle with 
the Spanish authorities over their actions in relation to competing bids for Spanish 
electricity operator, Endesa. The background to the case was that the Commission had 
cleared E.ON’s and ENEL/Acciona’s respective bids under the EUMR183 (a third bid 
(which was supported by the Spanish Government) by Spanish Gas Natural, did not 
have an EU dimension and was appraised by the Spanish competition authorities
184
). 
Nonetheless, the Spanish authorities imposed conditions on the potential investors 
under powers which required those acquiring significant influence in a company 
active in a regulated sector to obtain prior approval for the transaction. Not only did 
the Commission pursue proceedings against Spain under Article 21 EUMR in relation 
to the measures adopted in relation to these particular bids, but it opened an 
infringement procedure under Article 258 TFEU, in relation to the legislation on 
which the authorities had relied.
185
  
In the Article 21 EUMR decisions,
186 
the Commission found that the actions were not 
justified by a need to protect the security of supply risks alleged and were contrary to 
the capital and establishment provisions and required Spain to withdraw them without 
delay;
187
 public security could be relied on only if there were a genuine and 
sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society  ̶ for example, if 
measures were necessary to ensure a minimum level of energy supplies in the event of 
a crisis. “In general, however, either appropriate regulation of general application or 
measures permitting an adequate specific reaction by the public authorities to forestall 
a given threat to public security will be sufficient to safeguard this interest and will, 
 
182
  Ibid, para 55. 
183
  Cases M.4110 and M.4197, E.On/Endesa (2006), Case T-200/06, Iberdrola v Commission (appeal 
withdrawn) and Case M.4685, ENEL/Acciona/Endesa (2007) 
184
  See infra n 218. 
185
  Infringement No 2006/2222, and Case C-207/07, n 144 (the Court declared that, by adopting the 
Royal Decree-Law, Spain had failed to fulfil its obligations under the rules on freedom of 
establishment and free movement of capital). 
186
  See E.ON/Endesa n 183 (decisions in September and December 2006) and Case M.4685, n 183, 
(decision in December 2007 IP/07/1858, Case T-65/08, Spain v Commission [2008] ECR II-00069 
(application withdrawn). 
187
  26 September 2006. 
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provided that such measures are proportionate and non-discriminatory, be less 
restrictive than the establishment of prior conditions as to ownership of relevant 
undertakings.” 188 
As the Spanish authorities did not withdraw the measures, the Commission eventually 
brought enforcement proceedings against Spain and the Court confirmed that, by not 
withdrawing conditions to the E.ON merger, Spain had failed to fulfil its Treaty 
obligations.
189
  
In BSCH/A.Champalimaud,
190
 the Commission also found that Portugal had 
improperly applied Article 21(4) EUMR to a transaction, this time in the insurance 
sector. In this case the Portuguese Minister of Finance relied on measures restricting a 
foreign firm from acquiring in excess of 20% of domestic insurance firms to prohibit 
a proposed concentration with an EU dimension between Banco Santander Central 
Hispano (BSCH), a Spanish banking group and Champalimaud (which was ultimately 
cleared by the Commission). The Portuguese authorities had not communicated any 
public interest to the Commission but in press statements had stated that they had 
acted to protect national interests and strategic sectors for the national economy. The 
Commission considered that the Government should have notified its actions to the 
Commission and that the protection of national interests and strategic sectors for the 
national economy could not constitute a legitimate interest within the meaning of 
Article 21(4). Further, it entertained considerable doubt as to whether the actions were 
really based on prudential rules rather than constituting a discriminatory measure 
designed to prevent the opening of the financial services sector to non-nationals which 
violated the principles of freedom of establishment and free movement of capital 
inside the EU. The Commission thus ordered the Republic of Portugal to suspend the 
measures adopted and to notify them to it as required. In the end, the Portuguese 
authorities agreed to modified arrangements which were also cleared by the 
Commission under the EUMR.  
Following the Champalimaud case, then Competition Commissioner Mario Monti 
stressed the importance of the Commission’s intervention in this case to the 
safeguarding of the internal market and that it should serve as a lesson that Member 
States should not try and prevent the opening of their markets to non-nationals and 
that operations which did not raise competition concerns should in principle be able to 
proceed. Since then it has regularly issued Article 21 decisions against Member States 
it considers to be violating the EUMR’s exclusivity provisions.191 In Cimpor, for 
example, it challenged the actions of Portugal, in relation to a proposed acquisition of 
 
188
  In so holding, it relied on the interpretation given to the concept in the golden share cases, see 
supra C.2.b and e.g., Case C-503/99, n 102, paras 46-48,  Case C-483/99, n 102, para 48, and Case 
C-463/00, n 102, paras 71-73. 
189
  Case C-196/07, Commission v. Spain [2008] ECR I-41. Eventually the ENEL/Acciona bid did 
prevail, see infra n 199 and text. 
190
  See Cases M.1616, M.1680 and M.1724 BSCH/A.Champaliaud (1999), IP/99/669, IP/99/772, 
IP/99/774 and IP/99/818, IP/00/296 (withdrawing the EUMR, Art 21 proceedings). 
191
  “Our line is clear: if interference by any Member State—is not justified by a legitimate public 
interest, the Commission will continue to condemn such national measures”: SPEECH/07/301, N 
Kroes, “European competition policy facing a renaissance of protectionism - which strategy for the 
future?”, speech to the St Gallen International Competition Law Forum,11 May 2007. 
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Portuguese cement business, Cimpor, a former SOE. The Minister of Finance refused 
permission to the transaction on the basis that its effects would be incompatible with 
the aims of privatisation (the measures were necessary to reinforce corporate capacity 
and efficiency in a way consistent with national economic policy guidelines). The 
Commission ordered Portugal to withdraw the measures holding that they constituted 
barriers to the freedom of establishment and free movement of capital and were not 
warranted under any grounds of public interest.
192
 Further the Commission launched 
Article 21 infringement proceedings against Poland (in relation to a merger between 
Unicredito/HVB
193
 which had been cleared by the Commission but which the Polish 
Treasury Minister intervened in order to protect the “privatisation” process of Polish 
banks and to ensure the de-monopolisation of, and the protection of competition in, 
the financial and banking services market infringed Article 21)
194
 and Italy (for 
imposing unjustified obstacles in the way of a concentration with an EU dimension, 
approved by the Commission,
195
 between Abertis of Spain and Autostrade of Italy).
196
 
Although in the latter case the matter was resolved prior to the Commission adopting 
an Article 21 decision, by Italy’s removal of the obstacles,197 the transaction did not in 
fact go ahead. 
Finally, it can be seen from the discussion above that although there have been a 
number of cases in which Member State have successfully relied on recognised 
interests to scrutinise a merger for its impact on non-competition factors, recognition 
of other legitimate interests have been rare.  
D.  EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT 
It has been in the sections above that there is evidence of protectionism and of 
Member States enacting and relying on legislation in breach of the establishment and 
capital provisions. Further, that such actions may be affecting the working of the 
market economy.
198
 Indeed, the events that unfolded following the Article 21 EUMR 
proceedings described in section C.3, indicate that although sometimes a bid will 
succeed despite the erection of national barriers to the deal,
199
 in other cases bids may 
be withdrawn (as was the case, for example, in the bid for Cimpor) or the deal 
 
192
  C(2000)3543 Final. 
193
  M.3894, IP/05/1299. 
194
  The Commission considered that the Polish privatisation rules infringed the free movement rules, 
see IP/06/276 and supra C.2, and that the Polish Government had by imposing conditions on the 
transaction, violated Article 21 EUMR, M.4125 (2006), IP/06/277. The measure taken by the 
Polish state (enforcing the non-competition clause set out in the privatisation agreements of the 
Polish banks) de facto prevented, or seriously prejudiced the concentration and unduly aimed to 
protect competition and did not purport to pursue any other hypothetical public interest.  
195
  Case M.4249 (2006), IP/06/1244. 
196
  IP/06/1418. 
197
  MEMO/06/414. 
198
  See Dinc and Erel, n 79. 
199
  Enel and Acciona were ultimately successful in acquiring Endesa and, under a revised proposal, 
certain parts of the business were sold to E.ON. Although therefore E.ON withdrew its bid it 
negotiated with competing bidders, Enel/Acciona to acquire certain parts of the Endesa business.  
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restructured to facilitate its success (as was the case in the Champalimaud and Polish 
bank cases).  
In addition, there are some indications that economic patriotism may be growing, 
fuelled perhaps by debate played out in the national press, the lingering effects of the 
2008 financial and economic crisis and heightened sensitivity about national security. 
Pressure from national business, politicians and interest groups may be making it 
difficult for national politicians to resist calls for measures designed to safeguard 
employment, industry and security in their country. In AstraZeneca/Pfizer, the 
political and media storm that the transaction attracted may have given Pfizer cause 
for concern that the Government would take steps to impose conditions to its 
completion and may ultimately have contributed to the failure of the bid. In 
GE/Alstom, the actions of the French Government led to the proposed transaction 
being significantly restructured. This type of outcome has caused one commentator to 
conclude “that while the Commission has the formal powers to order the suspension 
of national measures likely to frustrate a transborder merger, in reality Member States 
have the ability to modify and even frustrate such a merger. Time being at a premium 
for the merging parties, Member States do not appear phased by the prospect of 
infringement proceedings before the [Court] several years down the line.”200   
It is true that enforcement of EU law against the Member States by the Commission 
lacks (some) teeth. Article 258 TFEU permits proceedings before the Court only 
following (i) the issue of a letter of formal notice, setting out the subject matter of the 
dispute and giving the Member State in question a reasonable time to respond, and, 
(ii) a reasoned opinion, describing the infringement and giving the Member State a 
reasonable time to comply. Only after a failure to comply with a judgment of the 
Court, finding an infringement, and following the issue of another letter of formal 
notice, can pecuniary sanctions, aimed at inducing a defaulting State to comply with 
EU law, be imposed under Article 260 TFEU. In addition to being somewhat 
cumbersome, therefore, the enforcement procedure rarely results in proceedings for a 
sanction for an infringement being pursued; although financial penalties may be more 
effective in securing compliance with EU law they may impose extra costs on 
Member States and inflame resentment towards unpopular EU rules.
201
 Indeed, 
sanctions have not frequently been sought in the freedom of establishment and free 
movement of capital context.
202
 The system thus relies principally on naming and 
shaming and political negotiation to resolve infractions. Further, a decision actually to 
launch infringement proceedings involves delicate political choices to be made.  
Nonetheless, it is too pessimistic to suggest that enforcement by the Commission is 
ineffective. It has been seen that the Commission has shown itself to be willing to take 
action to counter the behaviour of Member States that it considers to be incompatible 
with the free movement and EU merger rules, both under Article 258 TFEU and/or 
under Article 21 EUMR. Further, that even if the Commission has not always been 
 
200
  Harker, n 80.  
201
  See B Jack, “Article 260(2) TFEU: An Effective Judicial Procedure for the Enforcement of 
Judgments” (2013) 19 European Law Journal 404 and D Chalmers, G Davies, G Monti, European 
Union Law (Cambridge University Press, 3
rd
 edn, 2015), 374. 
202
  See supra n 143.  
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able to act swiftly, or forcefully, enough under these procedures to prevent a Member 
State from impeding a merger transaction, such proceedings can produce the desired 
results. For example, in a series of cases, the Commission contested the very existence 
of expansive foreign investment laws, challenged golden share rules and required 
Member States to remove the offending measures. In addition, the Commission 
routinely acts under the EUMR where it considers that Member States are imposing 
unlawful barriers to EU mergers.  
If the Commission is concerned about, and wishes to halt, any new rising tide of 
protectionism, however, it would seem essential that it seeks where possible to 
challenge legislation enacted in breach of EU law immediately using the Article 258 
TFEU procedure. If it does not, the mere existence of the law may deter foreign 
acquisitions. Further, if it waits until such time as a Member State seeks to rely on 
those laws, there is a risk, given the time sensitive nature of most merger transactions, 
that its action will be ineffective. Once the Court has made a finding of an 
infringement, the Member State will be required to rectify the breach or face the 
possibility of subsequent proceedings and financial sanctions. Further, in the event 
that the breach is not rectified, private action will be facilitated.
203
  
Indeed, more effective enforcement of EU law in this sphere might result if affected 
undertakings become willing to seek remedies themselves. It is clear that the rules on 
freedom of establishment and free movement of capital are directly effective
204
 and 
may be relied on before national courts. Consequently, an undertaking whose deal is 
being thwarted, or has been thwarted, as a result of a Member State’s unlawful 
erection of barriers to its merger, might commence national proceedings for an 
injunction and/or damages. National courts owe a duty of sincere cooperation to the 
EU
205
 and are required, not only not to apply provisions of national law which 
contravene EU law,
206
 but also to provide effective remedies in order to protect 
putative EU rights
207
 and to ensure reimbursement or reparation of loss which has 
been sustained as a result of the violation.  
In a series of cases the Court has established that a Member State that levies taxes or 
charges in breach of EU law (including these provisions) must in principle repay the 
taxes levied but not due (the right to a refund is the consequence and complement of 
the rights conferred on individuals by provisions of EU law
208
) and in Test Claimants 
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in the FII Group Litigation v Inland Revenue Commissioners,
209
 the Court reaffirmed 
established case-law holding that a State will be liable to make reparation for loss and 
damage caused to individuals as a result of breaches of EU law for which it can be 
held to account where: (1) the rule of law infringed was intended to confer rights on 
individuals; (2) the breach was sufficiently serious; and (3) there was a direct causal 
link between the obligation resting on the State and the loss or damage sustained by 
those affected.
210
 It also confirmed that the first condition is satisfied where the rule 
infringed is that relating to the freedom of establishment or free movement of 
capital
211
 and that the second condition will be met if “a breach of Community law … 
has persisted despite a judgment finding the infringement in question to be 
established, or a preliminary ruling or settled case-law of the Court on the matter from 
which it is clear that the conduct in question constituted an infringement ...”.212 
Otherwise, a claimant will need to demonstrate that the EU rules infringed were 
sufficiently clear and precise to render the errors of law inexcusable and that the 
Member State should have recognised that the restrictions imposed were not 
justifiable and/or proportionate.
213
 Further, a claimant will have to prove that the 
damage resulted from the breach of EU law
214
 and that other factors were not the 
principal cause to the failure of the bid.
215
  
E.  CONCLUSIONS 
This article has examined when Member States may intervene to weigh the economic 
and other public policy costs and benefits of M&A activity within the EU. An 
intricate picture has emerged, requiring: (i) an examination of EU competences, EU 
free movement law, EU merger law, national merger and foreign investment rules and 
the complex relationship between them all; and (ii) three different scenarios to be 
distinguished. First, the extent to which Member States can impose obstacles to intra-
Union cross-border M&As on public interest grounds. Second, the extent to which 
 
209
  Case C-446/04, n 163. 
210
  Relying in particular on Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame [1996] 
ECR I-1029, paras 51 and 66. 
211
  Case C-446/04, n 163, para 211, (“In the main proceedings, the first condition is plainly satisfied 
as regards Articles [49 TFEU] and [63 TFEU]. Those provisions confer rights on individuals... .”) 
212
  Ibid, para 214. 
213
  To determine whether a breach is sufficiently serious the following factors must generally be 
considered whether: in the exercise of its legislative power, a Member State has manifestly and 
gravely disregard the limits on its discretion; the rule infringed is clear and precise; the 
infringement and the damage caused were intentional or involuntary, whether any error of law was 
excusable or inexcusable; the position taken by an EU institution may have contributed towards the 
adoption or maintenance of national measures or practices contrary to EU law.  
214
  Case C-446/04, n 163. 
215
  It is for the national court hearing the claim, applying rules of national law (subject to the 
principles of equivalence and effectiveness, supra n 208) to assess whether the loss and damage 
claimed flows sufficiently directly from the breach of EU law or whether other factors might have 
contributed to the failure. See also by analogy, non-contractual liability proceedings brought 
against the Commission, Case T-212/03, My Travel v Commission [2008] ECR II-1967 and Case 
T-353/01, Schneider v Commission [2007] ECR II-223 and, on appeal, Case C-440/07 P [2009] 
ECR I-6413. 
 Page 40 
they may impose obstacles to foreign investment from outside of the EU/EEA on 
public interest grounds and third, the extent to which they can authorise mergers 
which are liable to impede effective competition in the EU on public interest grounds.  
A fundamental tenet of the EU is that the internal market, an area within which the 
free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured, works towards the 
wider objectives of the EU, including “the sustainable development of Europe based 
on balanced economic growth and price stability” and “a highly competitive social 
market economy.”216 Consequently, Member States may generally only adopt 
legislation or other rules prohibiting, dissuading, discouraging, impeding or rendering 
less attractive investment, or an acquisition of shares giving rise to a definite influence 
over a company, emanating from another Member State where proportionately 
pursuing a public interest objective (as defined by the TFEU and the case-law of the 
Court). Whether or not they are reviewing a concentration with or without an EU 
dimension, therefore, Member States may act proportionately to protect accepted 
public policy interests (such as public and military security, plurality of the media and 
prudential rules) but may not act pursuant to restrictive laws or measures: purely to 
protect their own economic or financial interests; to protect open-ended and ill-
defined public policy goals; to shield national firms from competition; or otherwise 
act pursuant to such rules to impose disguised restrictions on trade between Member 
States. Such rules and acts create uncertainty which is liable to undermine business 
confidence and thwart achievement of EU goals. 
Despite established jurisprudence in this sphere the Commission has sought on a 
number of occasions to counter Member States’ measures which may breach EU free 
movement principles. If the Commission does wish to ensure that Member States do 
not erect irreversible barriers to merger transactions, however, it would seem 
axiomatic that it acts, as it did in the Golden Share cases, systematically under Article 
258 TFEU against infringing legislation as soon as it comes to its attention. If it 
delays M&A might be deterred by the resulting lack of clarity and time sensitive 
merger transactions may be obstructed. Even if it is true that such proceedings are 
unlikely to result in sanctions being imposed on an infringing Member State, they 
may be crucial for two reasons. First, the status of the national law will be clarified 
and Member States will be required to remove legislation found to be in breach of EU 
law from their statute books. Second, if the Member State does not comply with a 
Court judgment finding an infringement, and the infringement persists, the initial 
proceedings will provide the springboard both for subsequent proceedings by the 
Commission, and the possible imposition of financial sanctions, and/or private action 
by those affected by the breach. 
The extent to which Member States may restrict foreign investment from outside the 
EU/EEA on public interest grounds is less well-defined and more controversial. Not 
only is the division between the establishment and capital rules not clearly drawn, 
especially where measures applicable to third countries are at stake, but there is less 
clarity as to how the public policy justifications are to be interpreted in relation to 
restrictions operating against third country operators. It is established that the 
exceptions and justifications may be interpreted more flexibly, but the extent to which 
Member States may protect interests beyond those permitted in an intra-Union 
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situation (for example whether it may act to protect EU economic or financial 
interests) is unclear. This issue may become more important if the trend towards 
treating foreign investment with suspicion continues; in particular, Member States 
may wish to be free to limit foreign investment from countries where EU firms do not 
have free access to the market. It may also be affected by the conclusion of 
international agreements with pre-establishment investment commitments between the 
EU and third countries. Indeed, if national or third country treatment obligations are 
incorporated they are likely to bring the law in relation to these third countries more 
closely into line with that which applies in intra-EU situations. 
Where the EUMR applies to a merger transaction, Member States may not intervene 
to authorise a merger raising competition concerns on public interest grounds. Where 
it does not apply, however, there appears to be no EU barrier to Member States’ 
exercising regulatory approval of mergers between domestic companies on public 
interest grounds. Because of this, the Commission has, over the years, expressed 
particular concern about the operation of a rule, set out in the EUMR, which excludes 
EU jurisdiction over a concentration where each of the undertakings concerned 
achieves more than two-thirds of its EU turnover within one and the same Member 
State.
217
 Although, the two-thirds proviso ordinarily distinguishes satisfactorily 
between concentrations with EU relevance and those without it, it seems that there are 
“a small number of cases with potential cross-border effects in the [EU] which . . . fall 
under the competence of the NCAs as a result of this rule.” Further that, “[i]n a 
substantive respect, public interest considerations other than competition policy have 
been applied in a number of cases falling under this threshold to authorize mergers 
which could have given rise to competition concerns.”218 For example, a merger 
between energy companies E.ON/Ruhrgas fell outside the scope of the EUMR and the 
German Government’s decision to authorise the creation of the national champion, 
following the prohibition of the merger by the Bundeskartellamt, caused considerable 
consternation and anxiety about the impact of the merger on competition throughout 
the EU.
219
 In order to rectify this problem, and to seek to guarantee that merger 
control across the EU ensures the protection of undistorted competition, a 
reconsideration of the two-thirds rule set out in the EUMR would be required. 
Whether or not the Commission will be prepared to pursue such a change and/or 
whether it might become more sympathetic to the creation of national, or EU, 
champions remains to be seen.  
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